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HOURS EQUITY IS THE NEW PAY EQUITY
NANTIYA RUAN* & NANCY REICHMAN**
“[S]he’s part time, where is she going to go?”
—Manager of female low-wage worker, in Capruso v.
Hartford Financial Service Group, Inc.1
“Scheduling is a form of compensation.  It is a very tangible benefit to
employees, but the costs are hidden and don’t appear
as a line item on any budget.”
—Lisa Disselkamp, Workforce Management Technology
Consultant, Athena Enterprises2
I. INTRODUCTION
AT the dawning of the fifty-year anniversary of the Equal Pay Act of1963 (EPA),3 as well as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title
VII), it is time to change the way we think about pay equity.  Workplace
fairness between women and men should no longer be framed merely by
total disparities in pay, but also by disparities in hours given to women seek-
ing as much work as their male counterparts.  Doing so recognizes the
realities of many female workers in today’s workplace and addresses the
shortfalls thus far absent from the civil rights conversation about pay
equity.
Today’s workforce is filled with part-time, female contingent workers
who are at the mercy of their supervisors as to the number and scheduling
of hours they work.  The number of part-time workers has steadily in-
creased over the last decade, with involuntary part-time workers (those
forced to downgrade from full-time to part-time because of economic con-
* Lawyering Process Professor and Director, Lawyering Process Program,
University of Denver Sturm College of Law.  The authors thank the Colorado
Employment Law Faculty Scholarship Group (particularly Professors Rachel
Arnow-Richman, Melissa Hart, Helen Norton, Beto Juarez, and Catherine Smith),
as well as the participants in the 2012 Labor & Employment Law Colloquium and
Law & Society Annual Meeting for their helpful feedback.  Thank you to Lauren
Parsons, who provided valuable research assistance.
** Professor of Sociology and Criminology at the University of Denver.
1. No. 01 Civ. 4250(RLC), 2003 WL 1872653, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2003).
2. JOAN C. WILLIAMS & PENELOPE HUANG, IMPROVING WORK-LIFE FIT IN HOURLY
JOBS: AN UNDERUTILIZED COST-CUTTING STRATEGY IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD 24
(2011), available at http://www.worklifelaw.org/pubs/ImprovingWork-LifeFit.pdf
(quoting LISA DISSELKAMP, NO BOUNDARIES: HOW TO USE TIME AND LABOR MANAGE-
MENT TECHNOLOGY TO WIN THE RACE FOR PROFITS AND PRODUCTIVITY (2009)).
3. Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. 206(d) (1964).
(35)
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ditions or the employer’s needs) numbering 8.2 million4 and the total
number of part-time workers exceeding 27 million.  Two-thirds of part-
time workers are women, and as the Congressional Joint Economic Com-
mittee has recognized, the gender pay gap is partly driven by the earning
penalty for part-time work, which pays less per hour than the same or
equivalent work done by full-timers.5
One under-examined factor in this pay inequity is the power of sched-
uling that employer supervisors have over their part-time work force.
From the outside, supervisors seemingly make capricious decisions on
whom to schedule, when, and for how many hours.  When individual su-
pervisors make these unilateral decisions without regard to employment
standards or criteria, they appear to do so with little oversight and gui-
dance, which can lead to discriminatory bias based on gender.  This gen-
der bias can be motivated (consciously or unconsciously) by societal
stereotypes casting women as less than “ideal workers”6 with weak commit-
ment to the workplace because of outside caregiving responsibilities.  Such
bias (both conscious and unconscious) can lead to women being sched-
uled both fewer hours and in less desirable timeslots.
From a doctrinal standpoint, however, the current statutory regimes
seem ill suited to address these disparities.  The Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA) of 1938 merely mandates minimum and overtime wages without
addressing minimum or required hours;7 the EPA does not cover hours
equity but only addresses pay rate; and Title VII’s anti-discrimination man-
date rarely reaches the issue of scheduling and is therefore sorely under-
developed.  Moreover, due to recent Supreme Court decisions
dramatically restricting employment discrimination class actions, bringing
aggregate litigation for low-wage workers will be an uphill battle, and attor-
neys are unlikely to take on cases for relatively low damages.8
4. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Economic News Re-
lease: Employment Situation Summary (Nov. 8, 2013), http://www.bls.gov/news.re
lease/empsit.nr0.htm.
5. See JOINT ECON. COMM., 111TH CONG., THE EARNINGS PENALTY FOR PART-
TIME WORK: AN OBSTACLE TO EQUAL PAY (2010), available at http://www.jec.senate
.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=74203874-3821-44e4-b369-4efbe14d8745.
6. See CECILIA L. RIDGEWAY, FRAMED BY GENDER: HOW GENDER INEQUALITY PER-
SISTS IN THE MODERN WORLD (2011) (discussing persistence of stereotypes at
work); Joan C. Williams & Stephanie Bornstein, Caregivers in the Courtroom: The
Growing Trend of Family Responsibilities Discrimination, 41 U.S.F. L. REV. 171, 173
(2006).
7. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE & HOUR DIV., Fact Sheet #70: Frequently Asked
Questions Regarding Furloughs and Other Reductions in Pay and Hours Worked Issues
(2009), http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs70.pdf.  “The Act does
not preclude an employer from lowering an employee’s hourly rate, provided the
rate paid is at least the minimum wage, or from reducing the number of hours the
employee is scheduled to work.” Id.
8. See, e.g., Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013); Wal–Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011); Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky,
The Failing Faith in Class Actions: Wal-Mart v. Dukes and AT&T Mobility v. Concep-
cion, 7 DUKE J. OF CON. L. & PUB. POL’Y 73 (2011); Judith Resnik, Fairness in Num-
2
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This Article makes the case for changing the way we think about pay
equity.  Because our workforce is filled with part-time workers, advocates
for low-wage workers should focus not only on pay inequities and living
wages, but also on hours equity.  Hours equity would provide much-
needed stability to scheduling that would allow female part-time workers
to have a reliable schedule with guaranteed hours so that they make an
expected amount of pay.
Part II describes the experience of many female low-wage workers in
retail America.  Based on a composite from the authors’ interviews with
non-profit agencies dedicated to fair employment practices, as well as low-
wage workers themselves, the story of Anna represents the plight of part-
time work and the difficulties women faced in an unstable scheduling
environment.
Part III explores the modern workplace and the part-time worker’s
place in it.  Because of employers’ strict adherence to minimizing labor
costs and the contingent nature of part-time, low-wage work, today’s work-
place is a precarious place without assurances of guaranteed
compensation.
Part IV outlines and analyzes the different statutory frameworks
meant to regulate workplace fairness: the FLSA, the EPA, and Title VII’s
disparate treatment and disparate impact provisions.  While each holds
potential to address scheduling shortfalls, without amendment, the only
current statutory framework that allows for address of the harms stemming
from hours inequity is Title VII.
Finally, Part V provides potential solutions to address the scheduling
shortfalls: lobbying for statutory gap-filling; community organizing and
collective action; and renewed public regulation and enforcement.
II. HOURS INEQUITY: THE EXPERIENCE OF FEMALE PART-TIME WORKERS
Anna was thrilled to land a full-time job as an associate at a big box
retailer after months of searching for employment.9  Her pay, $8.50 per
hour, hardly covered her expenses.  Still, she was happy to have a job in
this competitive job market with high unemployment.  Sharing wage infor-
mation was strongly discouraged by her employer, but John, another asso-
bers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers,
125 HARV. L. REV. 78 (2011).
9. This fact scenario is a realistic representation of the female low-wage retail
workers employed by large private chain stores, as described by workers and com-
munity organizers. See Confidential Fieldnotes and Interviews with Community Or-
ganizers and Retail Associates, in Denver, Colorado (Spring 2013) (on file with
authors).  For a similar account of how scheduling can negatively affect women
and their responsibilities, see Lawrence S. Root & Alford A. Young Jr., Workplace
Flexibility and Worker Agency: Finding Short-Term Flexibility Within a Highly Structured
Workplace, 638 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 86, 91 (2011) (“At the time Jan
was interviewed, her shift at Sylvania had been changed to afternoons, which dis-
rupted her already-tenuous work-family balance.  ‘I’ve been playing charades ever
since and now I’m not doing too well.  Child care is a nightmare now.’”).
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ciate hired at the same time, had inadvertently disclosed that he was
making the same.  With no family to support, John’s paycheck would
surely go much further.  Even so, she was grateful for her schedule that
allowed her to get her two small children off to school before she started
work.  Working these hours, she could demonstrate her work ethic to the
daytime supervisors who were reported to be the pipeline for advance-
ment.  After-school care would take a substantial chunk out of her
paycheck, but for the first time in years, Anna had a stable job.  She was
looking forward to promotions and pay raises that might make it possible
to afford the insurance benefits her employer offered.
Several times in her first two months she was scheduled for signifi-
cantly less than the forty hours she was promised, but she was not overly
concerned as she was back on track the following week and she was not
scheduled for hours that would greatly interfere with her family obliga-
tions.  Three months later, however, things changed.  Anna was scheduled
to start work at 5 AM, instead of 9 AM, as she had requested.  Anna
reached out to her mother and sister to help her with morning child care.
While they could help out that first week, they could not commit for addi-
tional weeks.  They, too, were low-wage workers and their schedules
changed constantly.  When she mentioned this to John, the associate hired
at the same time as Anna, he bragged that he always got the schedule he
asked for.
Anna approached her supervisor to see when she could get back to
the schedule she requested.  Her supervisor reminded her that when she
was hired, she had agreed to “open availability,” meaning that she was
available for any shifts offered between 5 AM and 10 PM, seven days a
week.  If this were no longer the case, her supervisor said, her status
needed to change to part-time.  Fearful of losing full-time work, she
agreed to her original availability, calling on neighbors, family, and friends
for help with child care, all the while hoping that she would soon have a
more stable and desirable schedule.  This was not the case.  Anna’s request
for a schedule that might accommodate her child care needs appeared to
have serious consequences.  Soon after the discussion with her supervisor,
her schedule became more erratic and each week her hours were reduced
by five to ten hours less than the expected forty.  Finding it impossible to
arrange child care for her children in the face of this fluctuating work
schedule, Anna was forced to become a part-time worker with no guaran-
tee about how much money she would earn in a given week and far fewer
opportunities for advancement.  John, with less variability in his schedule
and better able to accommodate changes, received pay raises and
promotions.
Anna’s story is surprisingly common and not just in big box retail
stores.  Low-wage workers across a range of work settings rarely have the
luxury to “choose” a work schedule that suits their needs and, instead, find
themselves hostage to the specific hours assigned by their employer super-
4
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visor.10  The scheduling challenges these workers confront include rigid
schedules that offer workers no control over the number of hours they
work or their starting or stopping times; hours assigned with no advance
notice; and fluctuations in hours from week to week.11  Rigid schedules do
not allow workers to handle the unexpected, including sick children, baby-
sitters who are late or fail to show up, or transportation malfunctions, with-
out fear of losing their job.  Variable schedules undermine even the best
efforts at managing caregiving, looking for additional work to supplement
one’s income, or pursuing educational opportunities.12  Across a range of
her empirical studies, Professor Lisa Dodson finds that low-wage working
women make “crisis decisions” in the face of irregular schedules,
mandatory overtime, a lack of sick or personal leave, required evening and
weekend hours, and little or no flexibility.13  When they attempt to negoti-
ate a schedule change to accommodate parental obligations, these women
are not only “met with a particular stigma . . . that of unworthy reproduc-
ers,”14 they are often assumed to be lying about their obligations to
others.15  Although some companies, like Anna’s, allow employees to
make scheduling requests, research suggests that they face “repercussions
in the form of reduced hours or being assigned undesirable shifts when
they took advantage of policies allowing them to request scheduling pref-
erences.  Thus without minimum hour guarantees or normative pressures
to provide them, workers may in effect pay for the opportunity to control
their nonwork schedule.”16  Too often, female low-wage workers are met
with reduced work just when they need it most.
“Scheduling shortfalls” is the term we use for the scheduling
problems low-wage workers face and for female, part-time workers who
face shortfalls because of the gender bias at play, scheduling discrimina-
10. See generally Elaine McCrate, Flexibility for Whom? Control over Work Schedule
Variability in the US, 18 FEMINIST ECON. 39 (2012) (delineating difficulties for low-
wage women workers in workplace).
11. See LIZ WATSON & JENNIFER E, SWANBERG, FLEXIBLE WORKPLACE SOLUTIONS
FOR LOW-WAGE HOURLY WORKERS: A FRAMEWORK FOR A NATIONAL CONVERSATION 1,
8 (2011), available at http://workplaceflexibility2010.org/images/uploads/whats
new/Flexible%20Workplace%20Solutions%20for%20Low-Wage%20Hourly%20
Workers.pdf.
12. See, e.g., Franc¸oise Carre´ & Chris Tilly, America’s Biggest Low-Wage Industry:
Continuity and Change in Retail Jobs (Ctr. for Soc. Pol’y Publ’ns., Working Paper No.
2009-6, 2008).
13. See Lisa Dodson, Stereotyping Low-Wage Mothers Who Have Work and Family
Conflicts, 69 J. SOC. ISSUES 257, 264 (2013) (citing numerous examples of women
workers needing to make sacrifices in personal lives due to low-wage working
situations).
14. Id. at 274.
15. See id. at 267 (discussing negative consequences of attempting to negotiate
schedules for low-wage women workers).
16. Susan J. Lambert, Anna Haley-Lock & Julia R. Henly, Schedule Flexibility in
Hourly Jobs: Unanticipated Consequences and Promising Directions, 15(3) COMMUNITY,
WORK & FAM. 293, 305 (2012) [hereinafter Schedule Flexibility] (internal citation
omitted).
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tion ought to be recognized as providing redress.  Anna’s story demon-
strates the number of ways that schedules fall short.  Workers may be hired
with the promise of a certain number of hours, only to find that they are
never scheduled for those hours.  Or, like Anna, they may start with a cer-
tain number of hours per week and gradually see that number reduced.
Scheduling shortfalls also occur when workers consistently receive less de-
sirable shifts that they do not request.  Not only did Anna receive a sched-
ule that was unworkable given her family obligations, but her complaints
led her managers to see her as less than the “ideal worker,” which led to
fewer promotions and pay increases.
Receiving fewer than expected hours to work and less pay as a result
can wreak havoc when rents are due and food needs to be on the table.  It
is difficult enough for low-wage workers to earn a living that would allow
them to make ends meet, even when they are lucky enough to get full-time
hours.  Scheduling shortfalls take a particularly troubling toll on female
head of households as they attempt to pay for and manage child care.  As
an example of such inequities, a survey of 200 mothers working in the
restaurant industry found half had unpredictable and erratic schedules,
two out of five had a last minute schedule shift which impacted child care,
and a third said that child care impaired their ability to work desirable
shifts.17  Strikingly, nearly a third of the forty percent of single income
mothers who pay for child care use up half their income to do so.18  Even
when they can find and afford child care, mothers who work unpredict-
able hours cannot hold spaces for their children when their own work and
income varies from week to week.19  Getting to work, particularly when
work is scheduled during non-standard hours, is challenging for low-wage
workers who rely on “off peak” public transportation schedules that in-
crease already long commute times.20
Rarely discussed by scholars concerned about the impact of hours va-
riability is the connection between scheduling and pay equity.  Anna’s
story raises a number of troubling questions.  While Anna and John ini-
tially received the same pay for the same work, the emerging differences in
the hours they were scheduled to work lead to significant differences in
weekly earnings, a key measure of pay inequity.  Thus, a key empirical
question is whether hours are allocated in a way that has a disparate im-
17. See THE RESTAURANT OPPORTUNITIES CTRS. UNITED, THE THIRD SHIFT:
CHILD CARE NEEDS AND ACCESS FOR WORKING MOTHERS IN RESTAURANTS 3 (2013),
available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/161943672/The-Third-Shift-Child-Care-
Needs-and-Access-for-Working-Mothers-in-Restaurants (surveying women about
low-wage working conditions in restaurants, specifically in context of impact on
scheduling and family life).
18. See Stephanie Bornstein, Work, Family and Discrimination at the Bottom of the
Ladder, 19 GEO. J. ON POVERTY. L. & POL’Y 1, 8 (2012).
19. See WATSON & SWANBERG, supra note 11, at 8 (discussing impact of con-
stantly changing schedules on feasibility and financing of child care).
20. See id. (examining impact of variable work schedules on transportation).
6
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 59, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol59/iss1/2
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\59-1\VLR102.txt unknown Seq: 7  3-APR-14 10:42
2014] HOURS EQUITY 41
pact on the lives of women and people of color, or are distributed in a way
that is consistent with or undermines pay equity principles.21
III. THE STRUCTURE OF WORK TODAY
Scheduling shortfalls are part of a paradigmatic change in the em-
ployment relationship from one that is stable and long-term to one that is
both more short-term and precarious.22  Because workers are less likely to
have long-term tenure at any particular place of employment, employers
feel a reduced obligation to provide such “benefits” as a promised mini-
mum number of hours or a consistent schedule.  This is true especially
where there is a premium to reducing labor costs in increasingly tight cor-
porate budgets.  So while some workers benefit from “employee flexibility”
to accommodate family needs, many part-time, contingent workers suffer
from increasing employer-driven “flexibility” that results in fewer and less
stable hours.
A. Changing Employment Relationships23
Prior to 1970, workers were employed in firms modeled around inter-
nal labor market structures (ILMS) that were “closed, inwardly focused
and hierarchically governed.”24  ILMS tended to favor internal hiring
practices that rewarded seniority and offered non-wage benefits to insure
loyalty and tenure.  William Whyte’s “organization man,” the over-con-
forming, loyal employee who spent his career at one firm and worked his
way up the ladder toward a secure retirement, has become a symbolic rep-
resentation of this form of employment.  The internalization of labor that
his story represents was possible because of sustained economic growth
and general stability.25  Strong unions and collective bargaining agree-
21. The authors are currently engaged in just such an empirical project, inter-
viewing female, part-time, low-wage workers about their schedules and scheduling
practices of their employers.
22. See generally Rachel S. Arnow-Richman, Employment as Transaction, 39 SE-
TON HALL L. REV. 447 (2008) (offering explanation for shift in types of employ-
ment relationships in broader context); Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt & Timothy A.
Haley, Governance of the Workplace: The Contemporary Regime of Individual Contract, 28
COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 313 (2007) (discussing changing nature of employment
relationships).
23. Many different terms are used to characterize this type of work, including:
precarious, casual, flexible, nonstandard, or contingent. See Dennis Arnold &
Joseph R. Bongiovi, Precarious, Informalizing, and Flexible Work Transforming Concepts
and Understandings, 57 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 289, 289 (2013) (identifying specific
aspects of changing employment relationships).
24. Matthew Bidwell et al., The Employment Relationship and Inequality: How and
Why Changes in Employment Practices Are Reshaping Rewards in Organizations, 7 ACAD.
MGMT. ANNALS 61, 62 (2013).
25. See Arne L. Kalleberg, Precarious Work, Insecure Workers: Employment Relations
in Transition, 74 AM. SOC. REV. 1, 1–22 (2009) (discussing institutional and struc-
tural factors giving rise to precarious working situations).
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ments were important to establish the reciprocal relationships between
employer and employee that defined this era of employment.26
Since the 1980s, ILMS have been replaced by systems of employment
that allow employers to adapt to changing economic and institutional
pressures, most significantly the increased competition that pressures or-
ganizations to manage costs.27  Cost containment often rests on the backs
of workers as employers view payment for labor that exceeds narrow defi-
nitions of demand as an unnecessary expense.28  Rather than imposing
significant layoffs, employers reduce the hours of the workforce as a whole
and then subsidize the resulting reduction in earnings with public pro-
grams.29  Referred to as “internal labor flexibility,” “just in time schedul-
ing,” or “employer driven flexibility,” workplaces that embrace this model
“hire or fire workers, or increase or lower their wages according to busi-
ness needs and worker performance.”30  Professors Lambert, Haley-Lock,
and Henly demonstrate that:
The goal of minimizing outlays for labor by holding managers
accountable for making sure labor allocations do not exceed
ongoing business demand—by week, day, and for some firms,
hour—creates a situation ripe for workers experiencing too few
rather than too many hours and fluctuating work times rather
than rigid ones.31
These changing employment relationships have emerged within the
spatial restructuring of work on a global scale.  Advances in technology
have made it possible for goods, capital, and people to circulate with un-
precedented speed across borders, no longer tied to time and space.  Free
from the spatial and temporal constraints and with the entry of new,
densely populated countries into the global economy, employers are bet-
ter able to seek out cheap labor wherever they can.  Gone is a sense of
loyalty or commitment.  Employment is a transaction rather than a rela-
tionship, an arrangement that can be altered or broken on a moment’s
notice.32
The profound restructuring of employment also includes major com-
panies shedding off the functions of workforce management to other net-
26. See Bidwell et al., supra note 24, at 66 (noting study’s findings that senior-
ity based practices were initially adopted in unionized industries).
27. See id. at 62 (examining evolution of structural and economic concerns for
employers).
28. See Schedule Flexibility, supra note 16, at 295 (discussing employer concerns
about costs and expenses in relation to pay).
29. See Arnold & Bongiovi, supra note 23, at 295 (discussing goal of employers
to avoid layoffs and indicating that consequences of this strategy fall upon hours
for workers).
30. Id.
31. Schedule Flexibility, supra note 16, at 296.
32. See Dau-Schmidt & Haley, supra note 22 (conceiving of employment as
transaction and discussing implications).
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works of organizations.  Professor Weil describes this as “fissured
employment,” in which employers contract out, outsource, or subcontract
their business functions to shift labor costs and liabilities to smaller busi-
nesses or third-party labor intermediaries.33  Introducing an intermediary
into the mix of employment relationships transforms it from a hierarchical
firm-employee relationship into a market-based triadic exchange,34 not
only affecting where and how regulators must look to enforce workplace
fairness, but also where, when, and how workers can challenge policies
they feel are unfair35 and how regulatory agencies can intervene.36
Within these market-driven employment practices, the conditions of work
are evaluated as part of the “business case” rather than normative compli-
ance with government regulation.37
Changing metrics for assessing corporate success, in particular the in-
creasing significance of shareholder value, provided momentum for the
change to more transactional, market-mediated, and fissured employ-
ment.  Shareholder value is grounded in a “portfolio theory of the firm”
that conceptualizes firms as bundles of assets rather than discrete,
bounded organizational entities whose sole purpose is to increase value,
defined in terms of the short time profits associated with appreciating
share price.38  Today, firms are conceptualized less in terms of relation-
ships and more as streams of cash flow that can be shuffled and trans-
formed when economic conditions change.39  Managing labor costs is an
important strategy in the financialization of the firm, and when combined
with a shift in public policy away from an emphasis on achieving full em-
ployment to a focus on price stability, has produced the domestic deregu-
33. See ERIN HATTON, THE TEMP ECONOMY: FROM KELLY GIRLS TO PERMATEMPS
IN POSTWAR AMERICA (2011) (providing parallel discussion of rise of temp indus-
try); DAVID WEIL, IMPROVING WORKPLACE CONDITIONS THROUGH STRATEGIC EN-
FORCEMENT: A REPORT TO THE WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION 9 (2010) (detailing
conclusions about workplace conditions resulting from employers distributing
workplace functions to other organizations).
34. See Bidwell et al., supra note 24, at 70 (describing effect of adding interme-
diary into employment relationship).
35. See Timothy P. Glynn, Taking the Employer out of Employment Law?  Accounta-
bility for Wage and Hour Violations in an Age of Enterprise Disaggregation, 5 EMP. RTS. &
EMP. POL’Y J. 101, 111 (2011) (delineating recourse options for workers dealing
with unjust policies).
36. See WEIL, supra note 33, at 9 (clarifying role of administrative agencies in
implementing workplace fairness).
37. See generally FRANK DOBBIN, INVENTING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY (2009); Rocio
Bonet et al., Labor Market Intermediaries and the New Paradigm for Human Resources, 7
ACAD. MGMT. ANNALS 341 (2013) (expanding further upon notion of market-
driven workplace initiatives).
38. See Gerald F. Davis, The Rise and Fall of Finance and the End of the Society of
Organizations, 23 ACAD. OF MGMT. PERSP. 27, 33–34 (2009) (clarifying “portfolio
theory of the firm” and implications of this model for workplace relationships).
39. See GRETA R. KRIPPNER, CAPITALIZING ON CRISIS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF
THE RISE OF FINANCE 7–9 (2012).
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lation of industries and the outsourcing of production to low-wage
countries, policies that have weakened the bargaining power of workers.
The decline in union density40 is certainly a cause and consequence
of shifting work arrangements as well.  The percentage of workers repre-
sented by unions fell to 11.3% in 2012, the lowest percentage since 1916,
according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics.41  Without the process of col-
lective bargaining, workers are left to negotiate on their own.  Workers
have neither the power nor information to challenge employer practices.
The effect of the lack of unionization for employee control over schedul-
ing is clearly demonstrated by cross-country comparison.  In Germany and
Denmark, for example, collective bargaining agreements require employ-
ers to provide significantly greater advance notice of schedules (twenty-six
and sixteen weeks respectfully).42
B. Hours Instability in Low-Wage Part-Time Work
In the face of market-mediated, transactional employment, work has
become “uncertain, unpredictable, and risky,”43 particularly so for today’s
low-wage workers.  Trapped in models that prioritize containing labor
costs, many low-wage workers are forced to adapt to non-standard, often
variable and unpredictable scheduling.44  Advances in scheduling technol-
ogies make this possible.  Software allows employers to track activities in
40. See Bruce Western & Jake Rosenfeld, Unions, Norms, and the Rise in U.S.
Wage Inequality, 76 AM. SOC. REV. 513, 513–14 (2011) (discussing relationship be-
tween inequality and unions).
41. See Steven Greenhouse, Share of the Work Force in a Union Falls to a 97-Year
Low, 11.3%, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/24/
business/union-membership-drops-despite-job-growth.html?_r=0 (further elabo-
rating impact of unions on workplace relationships); U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU
OF LABOR STATISTICS, Economic News Release: Union Members Summary (Jan. 23, 2013),
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm.
42. See Franc¸oise Carre´ & Chris Tilly, A Framework for International Comparative
Analysis of the Determinants of Job Quality, in ARE BAD JOBS INEVITABLE?  TRENDS, DE-
TERMINANTS AND RESPONSES TO JOB QUALITY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 84
(Chris Warhurst et al. eds., 2012) (discussing comparative collective bargaining
systems).
43. Kalleberg, supra note 25, at 2.
44. See Schedule Flexibility, supra note 16 (discussing scheduling challenges and
overall predicament of low-wage workers); Susan J. Lambert, Making a Difference for
Hourly Employees, in WORK-LIFE POLICIES 175–76 (Ann C. Crouter & Alan Booth
eds., 2009) [hereinafter Lambert, Making a Difference] (discussing specific issues for
hourly employees in context of family and organizational dynamics); Susan J. Lam-
bert, Passing the Buck: Labor Flexibility Practices that Transfer Risk onto Hourly Workers,
61 HUM. REL. 1203 (2008) [hereinafter Lambert, Passing the Buck] (elaborating on
nature of incentives causing employers to reduce hours and flexibility for work-
ers); Jennifer E. Swanberg et al., Schedule Control, Supervisor Support and Work Engage-
ment: A Winning Combination for Workers in Hourly Jobs?, 79 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV.
613 (2011) [hereinafter Schedule Control] (suggesting institutional and organiza-
tional responses to lower workplace flexibility for hourly workers); Jennifer E.
Swanberg et al., Workplace Flexibility for Hourly Lower-Wage Employees: A Strategic Busi-
ness Practice Within One National Retail Firm, 11 PSYCHOLOGIST-MANAGER J. (2008)
(examining flexible work options offered to workers in lower-wage hourly posi-
10
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fifteen-minute increments (or less) and to adjust staffing levels daily to
respond just-in-time.45  The move to just-in-time scheduling and the hours
instability it creates is most prevalent for workers in the retail section
where businesses are expected to be open 24/7 and “nonstandard (and
indeed variable) working hours are the norm.”46  These precarious work-
ers face real and perceived job insecurity,47 earning volatility,48 and a loss
of workplace benefits,49 along with the challenges of obtaining affordable
and reliable child care, transportation to work, and access to education
described earlier.
The workers that face the highest levels of unpredictability and varia-
bility in scheduling are part-time workers, a workforce that has increased
steadily over the last decade.  As noted earlier, two-thirds of part-time
workers are women.  In June 2013, the total number of part-time workers
in the United States exceeded 28 million.  Approximately 7.8 million
workers were classified as involuntary part-time workers, forced to down-
grade from full-time to part-time because of the economy.50  Employment
growth after the so-called Great Recession has come from lower-wage part-
time jobs;51 sixty percent of the jobs added nationally in July 2013 were
part-time.  In 2012, the National Employment Law Project found that
lower-wage occupations constituted twenty-one percent of recession job
losses, and fifty-eight percent of recovery growth, emphasizing the way that
tions); WILLIAMS & HUANG, supra note 2 (discussing current implications of
changes in workplace schedule flexibility to families of low-wage hourly workers).
45. See WATSON & SWANBERG, supra note 11, at 13 (discussing technology
which allows employers to readily adjust schedules and make use of practices that
prioritize labor cost containment).
46. Francoise Carre´ & Chris Tilly, Short Hours, Long Hours: Hour Levels and
Trends in the Retail Industry in the United States, Canada, and Mexico 2 (Upjohn Inst.
for Emp’t Research, Working Paper No. 12-183, 2012) [hereinafter Short Hours].
47. See Kalleberg, supra note 25, at 7 (explaining how working conditions fos-
ter job insecurity for low-wage hourly workers).
48. See Bruce Western et al., Economic Insecurity and Social Stratification, 38 ANN.
REV. OF SOC. 341, 341, 344–45 (2012) (discussing, fully, economic insecurity
among low-wage workers).
49. A recent study estimated that only twenty-six percent of large employers
provided these benefits in 2011 compared with sixty-six percent in 1988. See KAISER
FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH & EDUC. TRUST, EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS:
2012 ANNUAL SURVEY 171 (2012), available at http://kff.org/private-insurance/re-
port/employer-health-benefits-2012-annual-survey/ (reporting conditions for low-
wage workers and showing loss of benefits).
50. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Economic News Re-
lease: Employment Situation Summary (Nov. 8, 2013), http://www.bls.gov/news.re
lease/empsit.nr0.htm (noting that 7.8 million part-time workers were forced to
downgrade from full-time positions).
51. See JOHN SCHMITT, CTR. FOR ECON. & POL’Y RESEARCH, LOW-WAGE LESSONS
1 (2012); Annette Bernhardt, The Role of Labor Market Regulation in Rebuilding Eco-
nomic Opportunity in the U.S., 39 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 354, 355 (2012) (discussing
impact of low-wage employment in wake of economic recession, especially with
respect to job growth).
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employment in the U.S. has shifted towards more precarious work.52  The
practice of controlling labor costs through the use of part-time workers
and shortened minimum hours for full-time workers is expected to con-
tinue to grow to more than half the workforce in the years ahead.53
Part-time work is most often low-wage work.  The Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) reported that in 2009,
one-fourth of U.S. workers were in low-wage jobs, the highest number in
any of the OECD countries.54  A job was defined as low-wage if workers
earned less than two-thirds of the national median.55  “The incidence of
low-wage work in the United States was higher in 2010 (almost 27 percent)
than it had been in 1979 (about 22 percent).”56  The low-wage workforce
has changed over the last three decades to include fewer teenagers (one in
four in 1979 to less than one in eight in 2011), higher levels of education,
and more men (thirty-five percent of low-wage workers in 1979 and forty-
five percent in 2011), a reflection in part of the most recent recession.57
Although there is general consensus among management scholars
that contingent employment relationships are becoming more prevalent,
particularly in some sectors,58 reliable estimates of the numbers of workers
who face the hours instability associated with non-standard scheduling are
hard to find.  This is true, in part, because we do not yet have the vocabu-
lary to adequately capture the “new normal” for the conditions these work-
ers face.59  While the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides data that
distinguish working part-time for economic and non-economic reasons,
there are few studies that “drill down” to the question of the kinds of
schedules workers want and, most importantly, any differences between
how many hours employees wish to work and what they are actually sched-
uled to work.  In a recent Bureau of Labor Statistics Study, roughly twenty
percent of female part-time workers and twenty-nine percent of male part-
time workers were working part time for economic reasons, demonstrating
52. See NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, THE LOW-WAGE RECOVERY & GROWING INE-
QUALITY 1 (2012), available at http://www.nelp.org/page/-/Job_Creation/Low
WageRecovery2012.pdf?nocdn=1 (discussing employment statistics relevant to low-
wage workers, particularly after recession).
53. See Short Hours, supra note 46, at 7 (explaining that trend of using low-
wage working policies as method of controlling labor costs is likely to continue).
54. See SCHMITT, supra note 51, at 1 (discussing low-wage working statistics in
comparative context).
55. See id. (discussing evolving definitions of low-wage employment).
56. Id. at 4.
57. See JOHN SCHMITT & JANELLE JONES, CTR. FOR ECON. & POL’Y RESEARCH,
LOW-WAGE WORKERS ARE OLDER AND BETTER EDUCATED THAN EVER 2 (2012) (ana-
lyzing demographic changes in low-wage workforce).
58. See Bidwell et al., supra note 24, at 70 (examining significant changes in
nature of employment relationships).
59. See generally Brian W. Ward, Implications of Using Different Measures of Work
Shift in Survey Research, 5 J. APPLIED SOC. SCI. 62 (2011) (discussing challenges of
using existing survey methods and data to accurately provide statistics concerning
non-standard work shifts).
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a desire for more hours.60  Further, analyses of the 2004 Current Popula-
tion Survey revealed that nearly one in five workers (eighteen percent of
respondents) worked a non-standard shift, including a “regular” night
shift.61  Similarly, Professors Tuttle and Garr’s analysis of the 2008 Na-
tional Study of the Changing Workforce revealed that twenty-six percent
of respondents reported working flexible schedules or shift work, some by
choice.62  In a study of the retail work force in New York City, nearly sixty
percent of those surveyed were hired as part-time, temporary, or holiday
workers; only seventeen percent had a fixed schedule.63  A majority of the
New York City retail workers report that their hours vary from week to
week; forty percent face changes without their consent.64
Unfortunately, inconsistencies in the measurement of nonstandard
work make comparability across studies difficult.65  This problem is com-
pounded by the fact that the experiences of workers do not fit neatly into
study categories.  For example, studies that ask respondents to identify a
particular schedule that best describes their work in a given period of time
fail to recognize that workers in retail and service often move in and out of
work schedule types.  Fifty percent of the mothers responding to the Frag-
ile Families and Child Wellbeing Study (that allowed respondents to re-
port more than one schedule) indicated that they worked both standard
and nonstandard schedules in their current job.66
60. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, LABOR FORCE STA-
TISTICS FROM THE CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, TABLE 22 (2012), http://www.bls
.gov/cps/cpsaat22.pdf (defining part-time work as working less than thirty-four
hours per week and noting that 4,022 of 20,236 female part-time workers and
3,981 of 13,616 male part-time workers did so for economic reasons).
61. See Ariel Kalil, Kathleen M. Ziol-Guest & Jodie Levin Epstein, Nonstandard
Work and Marital Instability: Evidence from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 72
J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1289, 1289 (incorporating data from 2004 Current Population
Survey).
62. See Robert Tuttle & Michael Garr, Shift Work and Work to Family Fit: Does
Schedule Control Matter?, 33 J. FAM. ECON. ISSUES 261, 264 (2012) (observing that
fifteen percent of respondents worked evenings, nights, split shifts or rotating
schedules, while twelve percent of respondents worked flexible schedules).
63. See STEPHANIE LUCE & NAOKI FUJITA, MURPHY INST., CITY UNIV. OF N.Y. &
RETAIL ACTION PROJECT, DISCOUNTED JOBS: HOW RETAILERS SELL WORKERS SHORT 3
(2012), available at http://retailactionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/
7-75_RAP©over_lowres.pdf (describing results of study conducted by Retail Action
Project that surveyed 436 retail workers in New York City in Fall 2011).
64. See id. at 9 (observing further that when workers requested shift changes,
their managers often punished them by assigning less overall work hours or less
favorable shifts).
65. See Rachel Dunifon et al., Measuring Maternal Nonstandard Work in Survey
Data, 75 J. MARRIAGE FAM. 523, 524 (2013) (“Additionally, accurate estimates of the
prevalence of nonstandard work are difficult to determine when one survey allows
for a more expansive definition of nonstandard work than another.”).
66. See id. at 524 (contrasting this survey with others that only allow respon-
dents to choose one type of shift, standard or nonstandard, that best describes
their work schedule).
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C. Scheduling Shortfalls and Pay Equity
Part-time and variable schedules have particular consequences for the
financial well being of families in which women are the primary wage earn-
ers.  To start, part-time workers face an earnings penalty compared to full-
time workers; they are paid less per hour than the same or equivalent work
done by full-timers.67  Nearly two-thirds of those part-time workers who are
paid less are women, and more than one-third of women work part-time,
according to an analysis by the U.S. Congressional Joint Economic Com-
mittee.68  A U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) analysis of the
gender pay gaps among low-wage workers found that while hourly wages
were similar for men and women in 2009, the annual personal earnings of
women were less than men, regardless of marital status or the presence of
children in the household, in part because women worked fewer hours.69
Professors Budig and Hodges find the motherhood penalty to be largest
among the lowest-wage workers, also explained, in part, by hours.70
But do mothers always work fewer hours by choice?  Recent studies,
including estimates of the number of part-time workers who work part-
time involuntarily, suggest otherwise.  Professor Swanberg reports unpub-
lished data from the CitiSales project that thirty-three percent of full-time
and forty-three percent of part-time workers would like to work more
hours.71  Shortfalls in hours occur because they are either not offered or
67. See JOINT ECON. COMM., supra note 5, at 2 (“Part-time workers across a
spectrum of occupations earn hourly wages below those of full-time workers, which
contributes to the wage gap between men and women.  For example, for every
dollar of earnings a full-time worker receives in a sales or related occupation, a
part-time worker receives 58 cents.”); see also Arne L. Kalleberg, Part-Time Work and
Workers in the United States: Correlates and Policy Issues, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 771,
780–82 (1995) (showing that this is so even on pro-rata basis and controlling for
age, race, organizational size, occupational prestige, and tenure).
68. See JOINT ECON. COMM., 113TH CONG., FACT SHEET: 4TH ANNIVERSARY OF
THE FAIR PAY ACT OF 2009, at 2 (2013), available at http://www.jec.senate.gov/pub
lic/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=66769080-37f9-4e7a-b2fa-7ac208d9f575) (emphasizing
that as result of Fair Pay Act women employed part-time are disproportionately
subject to earnings penalties).
69. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-10, GENDER PAY DIFFER-
ENCES: PROGRESS MADE, BUT WOMEN REMAIN OVERREPRESENTED AMONG LOW WAGE
WORKERS 24 (2011), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/585721.pdf (ob-
serving considerable hours disparities between men and women because many
more women worked part-time than men).
70. See Michelle J. Budig & Melissa J. Hodges, Differences in Disadvantage: Varia-
tion in the Motherhood Penalty Across White Women’s Earnings Distribution, 75 AM. SOC.
REV. 705, 707 (2010) (“Differences in work hours and weeks worked per year will
therefore account for a larger proportion of the motherhood wage gap at the
lower end of the women’s earning distribution.”).
71. See WATSON & SWANBERG, supra note 11, at 23 (noting that most survey
respondents elaborated that additional hours were not available or could not be
reconciled with family responsibilities).  The CitiSales study included interviews
with employees and senior management within 388 stores. See UNIV. OF KY.,
CitiSales Study—Research Design, http://www.uky.edu/Centers/iwin/citisales/study-
design.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2014).
14
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 59, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol59/iss1/2
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\59-1\VLR102.txt unknown Seq: 15  3-APR-14 10:42
2014] HOURS EQUITY 49
they must be turned down because they cannot be planned for in advance,
contributing to both weekly and annual pay gaps.
Pay inequity and the scheduling challenges that may exacerbate it is a
family issue as more and more primary wage earners are women and part-
time workers.  Professor Shaefer estimates that the percentage of part-time
workers who are primary wage earners has grown substantially over the last
several decades to thirty-six percent of all part-time workers in 2007.72  Not
all part-time, primary workers do so voluntarily.  Ten percent of part-time
wage earners are primary earners who are working part-time because of
economic conditions beyond their control.73  A recent study by the Pew
Research Center revealed a record forty percent of all households with
children under the age of eighteen include mothers who were either the
sole or primary source of income for the family, compared to eleven per-
cent in 1960.  Sixty-three percent of the so-called “breadwinner moms”
were single mothers.74
IV. THE CASE FOR HOURS EQUITY IN THE LAW
To address the growing pay gap facing female workers, the law needs
to shift from a narrow focus on minimum wage and antidiscrimination
efforts towards a larger lens of “pay equity” as “hours parity.”  As witnessed
in Parts II and III, hourly workers face a growing irregularity of schedules
that injects instability in the number of hours and timing of hours worked.
This instability has significant negative consequences for hourly workers,
who are disproportionately female.
In examining the pay inequities between female and male earners,
there are two under-developed dimensions of this pay gap.  First, there
exists an earnings penalty for part-time work, where part-time workers
earn less per hour than their full-time counterparts in the same job.  Sec-
ond, because of sex stereotypes, female hourly workers receive fewer and
less desirable scheduled shifts.  Both of these dimensions work to increase
the gender pay gap.  With this growing inequity is also the reality that the
worker protection laws put in place between fifty and seventy-five years ago
have not kept up with today’s changing workplace and workers’ needs,
creating a protection gap alongside the pay gap.
A. The Protection Gap in Wage and Hour Law
While our workplaces have changed dramatically over the last cen-
tury, the federal statutory regime put in place to regulate the wages and
72. See H. Luke Shaefer, Part-Time Workers: Some Key Differences Between Primary
and Secondary Earners, MONTHLY LAB. REV. 3 (Oct. 2009).
73. See id. at 6 chrt.1 (acknowledging that author calculated these figures
based on 2008 Current Population Survey Annual Social and Economic
Supplement).
74. See WENDY WANG ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR., BREADWINNER MOMS 1
(2013), available at http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2013/05/Breadwinner_
moms_final.pdf (noting that this study analyzed U.S. Census Bureau data).
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hours of American workers has hardly changed at all.75  Passed as part of
the New Deal legislation during a time of unprecedented unemployment,
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA) had the dual purpose of
protecting workers from job insecurity and unemployment, while also pro-
tecting the gainfully (and luckily) employed from chronic overwork.76
The congressional intent was for employers to “spread the work” by em-
ploying more people working non-abusive hours.77  As President
Roosevelt testified in support of the Act: “A self-supporting and self-re-
specting democracy can plead no . . . economic reason for chiseling work-
ers’ wages or stretching workers’ hours.”78
Enacted to address those goals, the FLSA regulates two aspects of
work: minimum wage and overtime.79  It established a minimum wage
“floor”80 for most workers,81 and mandated premium overtime pay for
work exceeding forty hours in a workweek, with exceptions for certain
75. See Nantiya Ruan, Same Law, Different Day: A Survey of the Last Thirty Years of
Wage Litigation and Its Impact on Low-Wage Workers, 30 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 355,
357 (2013) [hereinafter Ruan, Same Law] (referring specifically to Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act of 1938 and noting that it “was enacted during a time when workers
desired more leisure time away from their jobs but also wanted protection from job
insecurity and unemployment.”).
76. See Scott Miller, Revitalizing the FLSA, 19 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1, 2–3
(2001) (“Workers desired more freedom (time) from their jobs for personal,
home, community, and cultural life.  They were also concerned about unemploy-
ment, arguing that employers should ‘spread the work’ by employing more people
working shorter hours, rather than employing fewer people working longer
hours.”).
77. See id. (observing that FLSA addressed issues of overwork, underpay, and
spreading hours among more employees).
78. Jonathan Grossman, Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938: Maximum Struggle for
a Minimum Wage, MONTHLY LAB. REV. 22, 30 (1978) (quoting 7 FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT, THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 209–14
(Random House 1937)).
79. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–19 (2012) (provid-
ing section 206 to govern minimum wage requirements and section 207 to govern
overtime requirements).  Indicative of the time of enactment, the FLSA also pro-
hibited child labor and required employers to keep accurate time records. See id.
§§ 211(c), 212 (providing record keeping requirement and child labor provisions
respectively).
80. States can go above this minimum wage “floor,” and often do, but cannot
statutorily go below it.
81. The FLSA does not cover all workers; for many low-wage earners, the
FLSA simply does not apply.  For example, home health care workers subject to
the FLSA’s companionship exemption are not covered by the minimum wage pro-
tection.  Similarly, agricultural workers and live-in domestic workers are not sub-
ject to overtime requirements.  And tipped employees can have their wages
reduced by half of the minimum floor with only minimum tip generation. See
Rebecca Smith & Catherine Ruckelshaus, Solutions, Not Scapegoats: Abating Sweatshop
Conditions for All Low-Wage Workers as a Centerpiece of Immigration Reform, 10 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 555, 561 (2007) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(12), (21) (2000)).
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types of administrative, managerial, and professional work.82  Although
seventy-five years post-enactment, the FLSA remains the primary wage pro-
tection law of our country,83 and as several commentators have noted,84 it
is beginning to show its age.  “Overwhelming workloads” and the need to
regulate overtime continues to be worrisome mainly to salaried profession-
als, who are exempt from overtime pay.  And while premium overtime pay
is an important part of one’s take home pay for the hourly workers who
can get it,85 for most hourly workers, “undertime,” not overtime, is the
growing concern.
As currently structured, the FLSA fails to address the “hours” need.
Much like the economic impetus of the Great Depression that spurred the
push for the FLSA, today’s working poor struggling in a slack economy
lack legal protection for hours promised but undelivered.  The FLSA fo-
cuses on compensation for “work performed” as opposed to “work prom-
ised.”  State laws go only part way in filling this gap in wage and hour
protection.  For hourly workers that are scheduled and report to work just
to be summarily sent home, some states provide a minimum number of
82. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 207, 213 (2012) (providing respectively for overtime pay
and exemptions from minimum wage and overtime requirements for certain
white-collar professions).
83. But such calls to action have gone unheeded as the FLSA’s wage protec-
tions have only been amended once (in the 1940s) with little current discussion of
legislative fixes. See Portal to Portal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 251–62 (2012) (amend-
ing various aspects of original FLSA).
84. See Miller, supra note 76, at 46–77 (examining “Overworked American”
thesis and maximum hours permissible under LFSA); Ruan, Same Law, supra note
75, at 358 (discussing various scholarly criticisms of FLSA, specifically highlighting
those focused on need for it to be updated to provide for employer flexibility,
worker compensatory time, and expansion of its protections to new categories of
workers); David J. Walsh, The FLSA Comp Time Controversy: Fostering Flexibility or Di-
minishing Worker Rights?, 20 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 74, 79–110, 126–36 (1999)
(discussing major arguments for and against comp time reform and concluding
comp time reform might diminish workers’ rights); Daniel V. Yager & Sandra J.
Boyd, Reinventing the Fair Labor Standards Act to Support the Reengineered Workplace, 11
LAB. LAW 321, 331–41 (1996) (analyzing various exemptions under FLSA used by
employers to minimize use of overtime and need for reform in this area); Gret-
chen Agena, Comment, What’s So “Fair” About It?: The Need to Amend the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 1119, 1126–56 (2002) (commenting on need to
reform FLSA’s Duties Test and Salary Test); Ashley M. Rothe, Comment, Blackber-
rys and the Fair Labor Standards Act: Does a Wireless Ball and Chain Entitle White-Collar
Workers to Overtime Compensation?, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 709, 726, 732 (2010) (articu-
lating need for reform of FLSA exemptions to cover employees who utilize mod-
ern technology and work more from home).
85. See, e.g., Misra v. Decision One Mortg. Co., 673 F. Supp. 2d 987, 991 (C.D.
Cal. 2008) (noting defendants misrepresented to employees that they were exempt
and not entitled to overtime pay); Kamens v. Summit Stainless, Inc., 586 F. Supp.
324, 328 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (observing that plaintiffs alleged affirmative misrepresen-
tations by employer about overtime which were sufficient to toll statute of limita-
tions applicable to their claims); Gentry v. Superior Court, 165 P.3d 556, 567 (Cal.
2007) (“The likelihood of employee unawareness is even greater when, as alleged
in the present case, the employer does not simply fail to pay overtime but affirma-
tively tells its employees that they are not eligible for overtime.”).
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hours to be paid to those workers.86  While over a dozen states have such
“reporting pay” statutes, most provide only minimum coverage (e.g., two
hours at minimum wage) and cover a narrow worker population.87  Simi-
larly, a smaller handful of states provide a minimum number of hours for
workers who are not scheduled but called in to work during their “off
days.”88
As employers in the new labor economy move to scheduling practices
that embrace labor “flexibility” by sending people home early and calling
them in when needed (in order to lower labor costs), more hourly em-
ployees are finding themselves scheduled to be “on call.”89  However,
under the FLSA and state wage and hour laws, “on call” time is only com-
pensable in certain, narrow circumstances, limited to times when workers
are “engaged to be waiting” as opposed to “waiting to be engaged.”90  Be-
cause hourly workers are often afforded some measure of freedom during
their “on call” time (thanks largely to technology such as smart phones),
the hours spent are rarely compensable.91
As scheduling practices become more attuned to labor costs and sales
fluctuations,92 part-time hourly workers find their hours become less sta-
86. See Charlotte Alexander, Anna Haley-Lock & Nantiya Ruan, Stabilizing
Low-Wage Work: Legal Remedies for Unpredictable Work Hours and Income Instability 19
(Univ. of Denver Sturm Coll. of Law Legal Research Paper Series, Working Paper
No. 13-43, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=2327903 (“[S]end-home provisions require a minimum number of hours of pay
for workers who appear for a scheduled shift but are then sent home early due to a
lack of available work or slow customer traffic.”).
87. See id. at 31–32 (observing that “the majority of states require two hours of
guaranteed pay,” and that “[s]ome states’ call-in pay laws apply only to particular
categories of workers”).
88. See id. at 30 (“States’ call-in pay laws generally resemble call-in provisions
in union contracts, requiring a designated number of hours of pay for workers who
are summoned to work during non-scheduled times.”).
89. See id. at 39 (“[S]ome restaurant managers already maintain a large pool
of on-call wait staff ready to come to work when customer demand requires.”).
90. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 136–37 (1944) (holding that
neither FLSA nor common law expressly precluded waiting time from being con-
sidered working time under FLSA, but noting that such determinations of whether
waiting time is compensable under FLSA will be determined on case-by-case basis).
91. See, e.g., Renfro v. City of Emporia, 948 F.2d 1529, 1538 (10th Cir. 1991)
(holding that district court properly found that city firefighters should receive
overtime compensation for on-call time, given specific facts at hand that made it
difficult for firefighters to pursue other interests during on-call time); Cent. Mo.
Tel. Co. v. Conwell, 170 F.2d 641, 646 (8th Cir. 1948) (holding that plaintiffs were
on duty for all hours which they may have had to respond to calls and should
receive overtime pay despite frequent long periods of inactivity and rest); Camp-
bell v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 70 F. Supp. 996, 998 (W.D. Pa. 1947) (hold-
ing that plaintiffs should be compensated for overtime pay when required to be at
work premises, despite intermittent periods of rest).
92. See Schedule Flexibility, supra note 16, at 298 (“When labor costs are mostly
variable and employers can incur additional costs when employees work more but
not fewer hours, logic dictates that work hours will be scarce rather than overly
abundant and schedules erratic rather than fixed.”).
18
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ble and often reduced.  But federal wage laws, and with little exception,
state wage laws, fail to address those fluctuations and reductions, and in-
stead, leave the “hours” out of “wage and hour” protection.
B. The Protection Gap in Equal Pay Law
Although pay equity has been a theme of gender rights litigation and
feminist jurisprudence for at least the past half century, equity in hours
distribution is rarely part of the conversation.  Yet, women disproportion-
ately feel the scheduling fluctuations and shortfalls facing part-time work-
ers.  First, women make up the vast majority of all part-time work done in
this country.93  But another dimension of the pay equity issue is that hours
are often given to male workers because of the sex stereotypes at play in
today’s workforce.  The disparity felt by female part-time workers who lose
hours to their male counterparts is not adequately addressed in the cur-
rent pay equity argument.
The EPA came into being during the mid-twentieth century’s fight for
women’s equality, although “[t]he idea of equal pay for equal work ‘dates
from the early days of the factory system when women were introduced to
industrial labor.’”94  It prohibits discriminatory payment of lower wages to
individuals who perform work substantially equal to work performed by
those of the opposite sex.95  The EPA predates the Civil Rights Act of 1964
by one year; it was codified in the FLSA, which originally made its claims
subject to all FLSA exemptions.96  Today, for purposes of the EPA, the
white-collar exemption was eliminated, allowing professional, executive,
and administrative employees to bring EPA claims.97  Additionally, pursu-
ant to the FLSA’s unique collective action mechanism, Rule 23 class ac-
tions are not permitted.98  Instead, plaintiffs seeking collective action must
93. JOINT ECON. COMM., supra note 5, at 1 (noting that in 2009, sixty-four per-
cent of all part-time workers were women).
94. Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Shattering the Equal Pay Act’s Glass Ceiling,
63 SMU L. REV. 17, 28 (2010) (citing BUREAU OF NAT’L AFFAIRS, EQUAL PAY FOR
EQUAL WORK: FEDERAL EQUAL PAY LAW OF 1963, at 3 (1963)).
95. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2012) (“No employer . . . shall discriminate . . .
between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages . . . at a rate less than [that
paid to] . . . the opposite sex . . . .”).  Under the EPA, any employer subject to the
minimum wage provisions of the FLSA must refrain from paying female employees
unequal wages for equal work.  The EPA also extends to executive, administrative,
and professional employees who are exempted from FLSA coverage for most pur-
poses. See BARBARA LINDEMANN SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMI-
NATION LAW 437–38 (2d ed. 1983).
96. 109 CONG. REC. H9182, 9193 (daily ed. May 23, 1963) (statement of Rep.
St. George) (“[T]he prohibition against discrimination because of sex is placed
under the Fair Labor Standards Act, with the act’s established coverage of employ-
ers and employees.  All of the Fair Labor Standards exemptions apply . . . .”).
97. See Education Amendments, Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 906(b)(1), 86 Stat. 235,
375 (1972) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (2012)).
98. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (“No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such
action unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party and such
consent is filed in the court in which such action is brought.”).
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bring a claim on their own behalf and all others “similarly situated,” and
each affected employee must “opt in” to the case by filing a consent
form99—a significant “second-class” status as compared to other class
actions.100
To state a prima facie case under the EPA, a female claimant must
prove that her job is substantially equal to that of a male worker who re-
ceives a higher wage in the same establishment: “equal work on jobs the
performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and
which are performed under similar working conditions . . . .”101  All three
factors—skill, effort, and responsibility—must be satisfied.  Once the
claimant makes the requisite showing that she is being paid at a lower rate
than her male counterpart for equal work, the burden shifts to the em-
ployer to justify the disparity.102  The EPA provides for four affirmative
defenses: unequal pay is lawful if the disparity is the result of payments
made pursuant to a: (1) seniority system; (2) merit system; (3) system mea-
suring earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (4) if the disparity
is based on any factor other than sex.103
In claims of lower hourly rates of part-time workers as compared to
their full-time counterparts, although part-time workers are technically
covered under the EPA,104 courts are divided as to whether the practice of
paying part-time workers at a lower hourly rate than full-time workers im-
plicates the EPA.105  When a female part-time worker is paid at a lower
99. See id.  “Under the FLSA, typical class actions are not permitted.”  Eisen-
berg, supra note 94, at 29 n.102 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006)).  “Each individ-
ual plaintiff must file a consent form to ‘opt-in’ to the action.” Id.
100. See generally Scott A. Moss & Nantiya Ruan, The Second-Class Class Action:
How Courts Thwart Wage Rights by Misapplying Class Action Rules, 61 AM. U. L. REV.
523 (2012) (discussing differences between court interpretations of collective ac-
tion under FLSA and Rule 23 class actions and analyzing negative effect that col-
lective action rules of FLSA have on low income plaintiffs in FLSA litigation).
101. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).  While the EPA applies equally to both women
and men, the author here uses an example from the perspective of a female
claimant.
102. See Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196–97 (1974) (“All
of the many lower courts that have considered this question have so held, and this
view is consistent with the general rule that the application of an exemption under
the Fair Labor Standards Act is a matter of affirmative defense on which the em-
ployer has the burden of proof.”).
103. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)(i)–(iv).
104. The courts have uniformly construed the EPA to cover part-time work-
ers. See, e.g., Lanegan-Grimm v. Library Ass’n, 560 F. Supp. 486, 488, 493–94 (D.
Or. 1983) (holding that plaintiff part-time worker sufficiently stated claim under
Equal Pay Act, showing she had not been compensated equal pay for equal work);
EEOC v. Sch. Bd., 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16971, at *1–2 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 31, 1980)
(holding that plaintiff part-time female custodians qualified for relief under EPA
by showing unequal pay for equal work), aff’d mem. sub nom. Marshall v. Sch. Bd.,
661 F.2d 914 (3d Cir. 1981).
105. Compare Lovell v. BBNT Solutions, LLC, 295 F. Supp. 2d 611, 620–21
(E.D. Va. 2003) (concluding that part-time female worker could compare herself
with full-time male worker for purposes of establishing prima facie case under
20
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hourly rate than a full-time male worker, their employer can raise the
fourth affirmative defense (“based on any other factor other than sex”) to
justify the disparity.106  The employer will raise the defense to say that the
pay disparity is based on the part-time status, which constitutes a “factor
other than sex.”107  “Although many part-time workers could successfully
state prima facie cases of discrimination under the EPA,” their claims are
often not successful when the employer raises the fourth affirmative
defense.108
But, sometimes, courts see the gender pay equity issues at play in such
a dynamic.109  As the federal district court found in Lovell v. BBNT Solu-
tions, Inc.,110 if part-time workers who brought EPA claims are prohibited
from presenting comparative evidence of treatment of full-time workers,
“such a rule would allow an employer to avoid the EPA’s strictures by sim-
ply employing women in jobs with slightly reduced-hour schedules and
paying them at a lower rate than their male counterparts,” thereby “com-
pletely subvert[ing] the EPA’s purpose.”111
A more commonly successful EPA claim exists when female part-time
workers know about, and can prove that, their hourly rate is lower than
their male part-time counter-parts—as long as they work in the same en-
terprise and can also prove that their work is structurally the same.112
EPA), with EEOC v. Altmeyer’s Home Stores, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 201, 214 (W.D. Pa.
1987) (concluding that EEOC could not establish sex-based pay discrimination by
comparing part-time worker with full-time worker); see also U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OP-
PORTUNITY COMM’N, COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 10(IV)(F)(2)(h) (2000), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/compensation.html (“[P]ayment of dispropor-
tionately lower wages and benefits to part-time and temporary workers affects wo-
men more than men.  For this reason, investigators should scrutinize closely
employer assertions of part-time or temporary status as a factor other than sex that
explains a compensation disparity.”).
106. See Martha Chamallas, Women and Part-Time Work: The Case for Pay Equity
and Equal Access, 64 N.C. L. REV. 709, 739 (1986).
107. See id. (creating difficult burden for female part-time workers in provid-
ing their lower pay is based on gender).
108. Id.
109. See Joan C. Williams & Elizabeth S. Westfall, Deconstructing the Maternal
Wall: Strategies for Vindicating the Civil Rights of “Car[e]ers” in the Workplace, 13 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL’Y 31, 37–39 (2006) (discussing case law under EPA allowing part-
time workers to compare themselves to full-time workers for purposes of stating
claim under EPA).
110. 295 F. Supp. 2d 611 (E.D. Va. 2003).
111. Id. at 621 (allowing issue of whether plaintiff, who was working reduced
hours—approximately three-quarters of full-time hours—performed substantially
equal work to her full-time counterpart to go to jury).
112. See Chamallas, supra note 106, at 740 (noting that interpretation of
fourth affirmative defense in EPA promulgated by Wage and Hour Administrator
of Department of Labor “clearly outlaws paying female part-time workers a lower
hourly wage than male part-time workers doing identical work”); Williams &
Westfall, supra note 109, at 39 (“[I]f a female plaintiff who works part-time brings a
Title VII or Equal Pay Act claim and seeks to prove her case circumstantially, she
would be required . . . to produce comparative evidence of favorable treatment of
21
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On the issue of claims of scheduling discrimination, where male part-
time workers are given better and more hours, the inequity would have to
be viewed in terms of total compensation of part-time work instead of
hourly units.  For pay disparity in part-time work, courts look at the singu-
lar unit of an hour for pay by comparing the hourly rates.  What, instead, if
courts look at pay disparity in total number of hours given by the em-
ployer, much as they do when examining salary differentials between male
and female professionals?  In other words, could courts analyze shortfalls
in scheduling of hours as a pay disparity issue?  How would a female
hourly worker make an EPA argument for disparity in scheduled hours of
part-time workers?  That male (part-time or full-time) workers were given
more hours than their female counterparts because they were deemed a
better, more “ideal”113 worker?
Perhaps, female hourly workers can prove scheduling discrimination
based on the sex stereotypes that motivated the scheduling shortfalls.
There is evidence to support the finding that sex stereotypes play an im-
portant role in hours allocation.  Managers and supervisors who give more
hours to men because they are the main “breadwinners” might not even
be consciously engaging in overt bias.114  As one team of social science
researchers found in 1986, female and male part-time workers are per-
ceived differently: “For women, part-time employment is generally associ-
ated with substantial domestic obligations, and female part-time
employees are consequently perceived as similar to homemakers . . . .”115
In contrast, part-time employment in men is associated with difficulty in
finding full-time employment.116  More recent studies support the conclu-
sion that these stereotypes remain in place today.117  Such stereotypes mo-
tivate managers to rely upon their male part-time workers as the “ideal”
worker supporting his family, while female part-time workers are left with
filling scheduling holes around the ideal workers.
In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court has noted the role sex stereotypes
can place in the workplace.  In Nevada Department of Human Resources v.
male part-time workers. . . .  [In most workplaces] no such comparators exist be-
cause no males work part-time.”).
113. See Nicole Porter, Synergistic Solutions: An Integrated Approach to Solving the
Caregiving Conundrum for “Real” Workers, 39 STETSON L. REV. 777, 777–78 (2010)
(explaining that female workers are often compared to ideal workers and struggle
to meet that idealized version).
114. See Marion Crain, “Where Have All the Cowboys Gone?”  Marriage and Bread-
winning in Postindustrial Society, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1877, 1940 (1999) (explaining that
incentive structures urge employees to work more hours).
115. Alice H. Eagly & Valerie J. Steffen, Gender Stereotypes, Occupational Roles,
and Beliefs About Part-Time Employees, 10 PSYCHOL. OF WOMEN Q. 252, 260–61 (1986).
116. Id.
117. See Porter, supra note 113, at 828–29 (noting that part-time worker is
often synonymous with working mother); Lambert, Making a Difference, supra note
44, at 176 (recognizing that stratification of hourly workforce often gives workers
of color, women with young children, and less educated individuals fewer opportu-
nities for capturing benefits).
22
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Hibbs,118 the Court examined a family leave policy and held that the state’s
administration of leave benefits fostered “the pervasive sex-role stereotype
that caring for family members is women’s work” and “fostered employers’
stereotypical views about women’s commitment to work and their value as
employees.”119
Scholars have remarked that sex and family caregiving responsibility
stereotypes increasingly have found their way into a variety of employment
litigations.120  Whether the EPA can be expanded to include hours parity
as part of the statutory charge of protecting against pay disparities would
require a broadening of the concept of “pay” to include total compensa-
tion, as opposed to hourly rates.  Given the focus on compensation for
“work performed” as opposed to “work promised” in the FLSA, such a
reading is unlikely without further legislation.
C. Closing the Protection Gap Through Antidiscrimination Law
Employment decisions based on sex stereotypes can violate the sec-
ond major federal antidiscrimination legislation based on gender—Title
VII—even “when an employer acts upon such stereotypes unconsciously
or reflexively.”121  Title VII prohibits discrimination based on “sex,” as well
as other protected categories including race, color, religion, and national
origin.122  For some types of claims, the practice is lawful if it is “job re-
lated for the position in question and consistent with business neces-
sity,”123 and no alternative practice with less adverse effect exists.124
Enacted one year after the EPA, Title VII was also born in the Civil
Rights Era.  “The primary political impetus for Title VII stemmed from the
civil rights crisis that erupted in Birmingham, Alabama in the early 1960s
when the city’s unapologetic police chief unleashed fire hoses and police
118. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
119. Id. at 738.
120. See Chamallas, supra note 106, at 737 (explaining that most courts have
been reluctant to find that less pay for predominantly female jobs created sex dis-
crimination claim); Williams & Bornstein, supra note 6, at 172 (citing four-hun-
dred percent increase in family responsibilities discrimination from 1996 to 2006,
as compared to last decade).
121. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, NOTICE NO. 915.002, ENFORCEMENT
GUIDANCE: UNLAWFUL DISPARATE TREATMENT OF WORKERS WITH CAREGIVING RE-
SPONSIBILITIES (2007), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/caregiving
.html.
122. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012) (“It shall be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer—(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, be-
cause of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . .”).
123. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
124. See id. § 2002e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii) (explaining that complaining party must
demonstrate alternative employment practice exists and respondent refuses to
adopt such alternative employment practice).
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dogs to quash a peaceful antidiscrimination protest.”125  Public support
for government action to protect racial minorities from such denigration
grew as television coverage broadcasted night after night of the horrific
scenes playing out in the South.  In response, “literally overnight,” the
Kennedy Administration crafted the first draft of a federal civil rights
bill.126  As the political process of passing the bill played out, the proposed
civil rights law was substantially reworked to pass both Houses of Congress.
As is well documented, the language and protections changed dra-
matically as conservative opponents proposed liberal amendments in a
strategic attempt to kill the bill.127  Many commentators believe that one
of the attempts to kill the civil rights bill included adding “sex” as a pro-
tected category.128  Others maintain that: “Such authors and commenta-
tors are wrong.  The prevailing conclusions misconstrue the complete
story behind the battle to add ‘sex’ in Title VII. . . .  Congress added sex as
a result of subtle political pressure from individuals, who for varying rea-
sons, were serious about protecting the rights of women.”129
Regardless, “the intense congressional debates that accompanied the
bill’s passage illustrate the competing interests, bitter battles and various
values that undergird the legislation.”130  It also helps to explain the com-
plexity of the law and the acknowledged difficulties in the judicially-cre-
ated complex burden-shifting framework that has been borne from that
history and compromise.131
125. David A. Forkner & Kent M. Kostka, Unanimously Weaving a Tangled Web:
Walters, Robinson, Title VII, and the Need for Holistic Statutory Interpretation, 36 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 161, 166–67 (1999) (citing Norbert A. Schlei, Foreword, in BARBARA
LINDEMANN SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW vii, viii
(2d ed. 1983)).
126. See id. (explaining that drafters finished proposal for federal civil rights
bill in two days).
127. See Robert C. Bird, More Than a Congressional Joke: A Fresh Look at the Legis-
lative History of Sex Discrimination of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 3 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN
& L. 137, 137–38 (1997) (noting that Congress’s addition of sex to Title VII’s
prohibitions was widely seen as joke).
128. See, e.g., Vicki Schultz & Stephen Peterson, Race, Gender, Work and Choice:
An Empirical Study of the Lack of Interest Defense in Title VII Cases Challenging Job Segre-
gation, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1073, 1084–85 (1992) (explaining that prohibiting sex
discrimination was viewed as joke, instead of sincere response to well-established
sex discrimination in labor market).
129. Bird, supra note 127, at 138.
130. Forkner & Kostka, supra note 125, at 167 (citing CHARLES WHALEN &
BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT (1985)).
131. See Martin J. Katz, The Fundamental Incoherence of Title VII: Making Sense of
Causation in Disparate Treatment Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 489, 491 (2006) (recognizing that
Congress has forced courts to try to determine type of causation required by dispa-
rate treatment law); Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53
UCLA L. REV. 701, 751 (2006) (acknowledging that few courts have attempted to
dismantle standard business practices without stronger statutory mandate);
Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 911, 940 (2005) (explaining that many aspects of Title VII, such as
24
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In addressing part-time hourly workers, Title VII currently has very
little precedent.  Yet there are two Title VII frameworks and both have
potential for remedy: disparate treatment theory and disparate impact the-
ory.  Disparate treatment theory has potential to address the scheduling
shortfalls that female hourly workers face when their managers allocate
more and better hours to their male counterparts based on sex stereotypes
about family obligations.  Disparate impact theory holds promise for reme-
dying both scheduling discrimination (when company practices are at the
heart of the inequity), as well as the earnings penalty felt (mostly) by fe-
male part-time workers who are paid an hourly rate lower than their full-
time counterparts.  As discussed below, even within Title VII’s current
framework, courts should conceptualize gender discrimination as protect-
ing female hourly workers from discrimination in scheduling.
1. Disparate Treatment Theory
Title VII prohibits disparate treatment on the basis of sex (among
other protected categories) with regard to all “terms and conditions of
employment.”132  As legal commentators have noted, the Supreme Court
has never been precise in defining what constitutes disparate treatment.133
But it clearly requires causation: adverse employment decisions are pro-
hibited only where they occur “because of” protected characteristics, in-
cluding sex.134  “Yet, the words ‘because of’ do not tell us what type of
causation is required”135 and courts struggle with the concept because
there is no “literal direct evidence of a state of mind.”136  As Professor
Charles Sullivan has opined:
how sufficiently linked specific trait must be to race or sex to count as discrimina-
tion, remain unclear); Michelle A. Travis, Recapturing the Transformative Potential of
Employment Discrimination Law, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 8 (2005) (noting that
Title VII case law has analytical errors).
132. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012).
133. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 985–86 (1988)
(“‘[D]isparate treatment cases, which involve ‘the most easily understood type of
discrimination . . . .’”); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
335–36 n.15 (1977) (“‘Disparate treatment’ . . . is the most easily understood type
of discrimination.  The employer simply treats some people less favorably than
others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”); Allen R.
Kamp, Ricci v. Destefano and Disparate Treatment: How the Case Makes Title VII and
the Equal Protection Clause Unworkable, 39 CAP. U. L. REV. 1, 6 n.42 (2011) (citing
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)) (indicating disparate treatment
of men and women in employment includes “requiring people to work in a dis-
criminatorily hostile or abusive environment”).
134. Katz, supra note 131, at 491 (illuminating ambiguity in applying Title VII
when employers rely on both legitimate and illegitimate reasons for firing
employee).
135. Id.
136. Kamp, supra note 133, at 7 (citing Michael Zimmer, The Employer’s Strategy
in Gross v. FBL Financials, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Nov. 4, 2009, 10:43 AM), http:/
/www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2009/11/the-employers-strategy-in-gross-
v-fbl-financials.html.
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Disparate treatment doctrine, whether individual or systemic, re-
lies ultimately on a finding of intent or motive to discriminate,
and no consensus exists as to what those concepts embrace or,
indeed, whether they are synonymous.  Certain core conduct is
clearly prohibited, namely conscious decision making to exclude
members of particular races either because of animus or other
reasons.  But the extent to which less conscious influences count
is unclear forty years after Title VII’s passage, and equally unclear
is when a trait will be viewed as sufficiently linked to race or sex
to count as race or gender discrimination based on that trait.137
Female hourly workers that face hours discrimination based on their
managers’ preference to give better and more hours to male workers
might be able to prove that the schedule shortcomings they face are be-
cause of their gender, if given enough evidence of sex stereotyping or
other discriminatory animus by the manager.  But that only gets them part
way towards establishing a disparate treatment claim.  In sum, there are
three potential shortcomings.  First, to make a prima facie showing, a
plaintiff must provide proof of a “tangible” or “adverse” employment ac-
tion, which currently does not include scheduling changes.  Second, be-
cause the disparate treatment framework is based on an equal treatment
model, courts often require comparator evidence, which might be lacking
given the high percentage of part-time work in gender-segregated work-
places.  Lastly, because workplaces that require part-time employees (such
as retail and other service providers) use scheduling models that empha-
size flexibility and reduction of labor costs, courts currently view part-time
work as part of a desirable, flexible workplace.  This ignores the schedul-
ing discrimination or hours equity issue, and instead, as currently concep-
tualized, excludes it from protection by Title VII.
a. Hourly Workers’ Scheduling Shortfalls as Adverse Employment
Actions
In making a prima facie case of disparate treatment discrimination
where the female plaintiff is relying upon circumstantial evidence to prove
that she was treated differently because of her sex, courts rely on the famil-
iar McDonnell Douglas138 burden-shifting framework: a plaintiff must first
make a “showing that she was a qualified member of a protected class and
was subjected to an adverse employment action in contrast with similarly
situated employees outside the protected class.”139  The burden then shifts
to the employer to show that there is a legitimate, non-discriminatory rea-
137. Sullivan, supra note 131, at 940.
138. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
139. Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1087 (11th Cir. 2004) (cit-
ing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)).
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son for the adverse action, which can be rebutted by the plaintiff showing
that the employer’s reason was pretext for discrimination.140
Although the prima facie showing is deemed “not onerous,”141 fed-
eral courts approach the adverse employment action element from very
different standpoints.142  Several courts have a broad view of the types of
actions that meet the standard, requiring merely a “tangible” employment
action, such as a negative performance review.143  Others take a “restric-
tive” view, requiring that the plaintiff suffer an “ultimate employment ac-
tion,” such as a termination.144  Another subset of courts adopts the
“intermediate” position as to what constitutes an adverse employment ac-
140. See Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252–53 (1981)
(describing basic allocation of burdens and order of presentation in Title VII case
involving discriminatory treatment).
141. Id.
142. See Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240–41 (9th Cir. 2000) (explain-
ing that circuit courts were split in determining what constitutes adverse employ-
ment action); see also Rosalie Berger Levinson, Parsing the Meaning of “Adverse
Employment Action” in Title VII Disparate Treatment, Sexual Harassment, and Retaliation
Claims: What Should Be Actionable Wrongdoing?, 56 OKLA. L. REV. 623, 623 n.3 (2003)
(noting three different circuit frameworks for adverse employment actions).
143. See Herrnreiter v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 315 F.3d 742, 744 (7th Cir. 2002)
(stating adverse action requirement is met whenever financial terms of employ-
ment are diminished, transfer significantly reduces career prospects, job is
changed in some other way that injures employee’s career, or where working con-
ditions are changed so as to cause “significantly negative alteration in [the] work-
place environment”). But see Longstreet v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 276 F.3d 379, 383–84
(7th Cir. 2002) (holding that employee’s “negative performance evaluations and
[the requirement that she] substantiate . . . her absences from work [as] illness-
related” were not “tangible job consequences and therefore . . . not adverse em-
ployment actions . . . under Title VII”); Oest v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 240 F.3d 605,
612–13 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding that neither unfavorable performance evaluations
nor oral or written reprimands sufficiently implicated tangible job consequences,
even though “each . . . reprimand brought [plaintiff] closer to termination,” ab-
sent evidence of any “immediate consequence of the reprimands”); Robinson v.
City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1300 (3d Cir. 1997) (requiring that retaliation
must be “tangible enough to alter an employee’s compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment”).
144. See Soledad v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 304 F.3d 500, 507 (5th Cir. 2002)
(“[L]ateral transfer . . . with no change in pay is not the type of ultimate employ-
ment action necessary for an adverse employment action . . . in a retaliation claim.”
(citation omitted)); Ledergerber v. Stangler, 122 F.3d 1142, 1144 (8th Cir. 1997)
(“[A]ction complained of may have had a tangential effect on [plaintiff’s] employ-
ment, [the employer’s action must] rise to the level of an ultimate employment
decision to be actionable under Title VII.”); Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104
F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that only “ultimate employment decisions”
are actionable); see also LaCroix v. Sears, Roebuck, & Co., 240 F.3d 688, 691–92
(8th Cir. 2001) (holding that, even if employee received poor performance review
as result of her report of sexual harassment, “a negative review is actionable only
where the employer subsequently uses the evaluation as a basis to detrimentally
alter the terms or conditions of the recipient’s employment”); Cross v. Cleaver, 142
F.3d 1059, 1073 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding that in order to make out prima facie case
of retaliation, employee must suffer “ultimate employment decision”).
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tion.145  But even in decisions that adopt the broadest view, harms
deemed actionable are overwhelmingly narrowly construed.146
While courts typically find compensation reduction to be sufficiently
adverse in nature to meet the legal standard,147 changes to scheduling
shifts are often not.148  Accordingly, part-time female plaintiffs who can
effectively argue that unwanted schedule changes come in the form of
hour reduction resulting in total compensation loss will be successful in
showing an adverse employment action.  And as long as they can show
through competent evidence that they wanted those hours and were de-
nied them because of their gender, a disparate treatment claim should be
met.
145. See Policastro v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 297 F.3d 535, 539 (6th Cir.
2002) (holding that to make out prima facie case of discrimination, plaintiff must
allege “a materially adverse change in the terms or conditions of . . . employment”
and “[r]eassignments without changes in salary, benefits, title, or work hours usu-
ally do not constitute adverse employment actions”); Traylor v. Brown, 295 F.3d
783, 788–90 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting Rabinovitz v. Pena, 89 F.3d 482, 488 (7th Cir.
1996)) (requiring that, to establish prima facie case, plaintiff must do more than
show she was treated differently than other employees, but rather, must prove that
“she suffered a materially adverse employment action,” which is defined as “ ‘more
disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities’”);
Weeks v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 273 F.3d 76, 86–87 (2d Cir. 2001) (affirming
district court’s granting of motion to dismiss because alleged claims, which in-
cluded filing grievance, notice of discipline and counseling memo, and transfer-
ring plaintiff to another office failed to state prima facie case that she suffered
“material” harm to term, condition or privilege of employment), abrogated by Nat’l
R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122 (2002) (“[A] charge alleging a
hostile work environment claim, however, will not be time barred so long as all acts
which constitute the claim are part of the same unlawful employment practice and
at least one act falls within the time period.”); Harlston v. McDonnell-Douglas
Corp., 37 F.3d 379, 382 (8th Cir. 1994) (“Changes in duties or working conditions
that cause no materially significant disadvantage . . . are insufficient to establish
the adverse conduct required to make out a prima facie case.”); Crady v. Liberty
Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Ind., 993 F.2d 132, 135 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding that
“materially adverse employment action” is element of prima facie case under Title
VII).
146. See Levinson, supra note 142, at 634–36 (citing various cases where Title
VII’s reach has been limited by courts, such as to circumstances involving only
ultimate employment decisions); Rebecca Hanner White, De Minimis Discrimina-
tion, 47 EMORY L.J. 1121, 1126 (1998) (“[T]here is a real and growing disarray
concerning which improperly motivated employment decisions are legally
actionable.”).
147. See, e.g., Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1300 (3d Cir.
1997) (“[R]etaliatory conduct must be serious and tangible enough to alter an
employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment . . . [to]
constitute [an] ‘adverse employment action.’”).
148. See, e.g., Watts v. Kroger Co., 170 F.3d 505, 511–12 (5th Cir. 1999) (find-
ing that allegations that employer changed employee’s work schedule and asked
employee to perform new tasks after she filed complaint about her supervisor did
not rise to level of adverse employment action because neither change in schedule
nor new tasks affected employee’s salary; there is not adverse employment action
where pay, benefits, and level of responsibility remain same).
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For claims of undesirable scheduling changes in the form of undesir-
able and variable shifts, there are a handful of courts willing to find such
schedule changes actionable, as long as the plaintiff can effectively prove
that the change was a “material and adverse” change in the terms and
conditions of employment.149  For example, in Spees v. James Marine,
Inc.,150 the Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiff suffered an adverse employ-
ment action when she was forced to take the night shift because it “ad-
versely affected her ability to raise her daughter as a single mother.”151
Part-time workers must show that the change: occurred because they were
women, was “more than a mere inconvenience,” and resulted in a substan-
tial harm to them.
One hindrance to being able to prove scheduling discrimination in
this way is that employers might let go of complaining part-time workers,
barring their ability to gather evidence of disparate treatment.  In service
industries that employ cadres of part-time hourly workers, managers, and
supervisors engage in “informal lay offs” to avoid “formal” terminations
that trigger adverse employment actions.  Professor Lambert, who con-
ducts empirical-based research studies on hourly work, calls this practice
“workloading,” noting that it allows “managers to reduce the number of
workers for whom they were expected to provide hours without the need
for formal action.”152  While this practice advantages employers (who can
more easily match labor costs to sales fluctuations), it disadvantages em-
ployees, both because of the loss of pay but also because it forestalls Title
VII action by avoiding the formal termination procedure that triggers ob-
vious adverse employment actions, hiding them from Title VII scrutiny.  In
such cases, courts should take their cues from EPA decisions, such as Lovell
v. BBNT Solutions, Inc., recognizing that “such a rule would allow an em-
ployer to avoid the EPA’s strictures by simply employing women in jobs
with slightly reduced-hour schedules and paying them at a lower rate than
their male counterparts,” which would “completely subvert the EPA’s
purpose.”153
149. See, e.g., Ginger v. Dist. of Columbia, 527 F.3d 1340, 1344 (D.C. Cir.
2008) (“As the officers convincingly argue, inconvenience resulting from a less
favorable schedule can render an employment action ‘adverse’ even if the em-
ployee’s responsibilities and wages are left unchanged.”); Freedman v. MCI
Telecomms. Corp., 255 F.3d 840, 844 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding transfer to night
shift as adverse employment action because “the change in hours interfered with
[the plaintiff’s] education”).
150. 671 F.3d 380 (6th Cir. 2010).
151. Id. at 392.
152. See Lambert, Passing the Buck, supra note 44, at 1220–21 (“This practice
had the additional advantage of maintaining a ready pool of workers who could be
put back on the schedule when demand increased.”).
153. Lovell v. BBNT Solutions, LLC, 295 F. Supp. 2d 611, 621 (E.D. Va. 2003)
(allowing issue of whether plaintiff, who was working reduced hours—approxi-
mately three-quarters of full-time hours—performed substantially equal work to
her full-time counterpart to go to jury).
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b. Finding Hourly Female Workers’ Comparators
At its core, disparate treatment theory rests on the equal treatment
doctrine, whereby an “employer must treat women like men only if the
women are similarly situated to the men.”154  If a worker gets to the final
stage of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, the plaintiff em-
ployee must prove pretext, where the courts often require proof of com-
parative evidence that the employer treated other similarly situated
employees more favorably than the plaintiff employee.155  Comparator
employees are similarly situated to the plaintiff employee when they have
“similar jobs and display similar conduct.”156
Again, courts are split as to how “similarly situated” the plaintiff and
comparator must be, with some courts holding that they “need not be
identical,” but rather “similar in all material respects,”157 while others de-
mand that they be “nearly identical” in “all relevant respects.”158  The
Eleventh Circuit, which has adopted a more restrictive approach to com-
parator evidence, held that requiring “identical” evidence keeps “courts
from second-guessing employers’ reasonable decisions and confusing ap-
ples with oranges.”159
Accordingly, most courts reviewing Title VII gender disparate treat-
ment cases require some showing of comparator evidence in order to suc-
cessfully prove pretext.  In the case of part-time hourly female workers,
proving that a male counterpart received hours that the female wanted is a
difficult, if not impossible, standard.  Even under the less rigorous “similar
in all material respects” standard, employers can easily show that managers
made rational choices around scheduling needs that have nothing to do
with gender, such as seniority, shift rotations, reliability, job experience,
and others.  This is especially problematic in gender-segregated
workforces, such as cashiers or wait staff where the predominant class of
workers are female.  Finding male part-time counterparts might be impos-
sible because they are nonexistent.
154. See Porter, supra note 113, at 791 (citing Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending
Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV.
1118, 1142–43 (1986)).
155. See U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713 n.2
(1983) (recognizing that plaintiff provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate
white persons were consistently promoted and detailed over him and all other
black persons); Burke-Fowler v. Orange Cnty., 447 F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th Cir.
2006) (reiterating elements of McDonnell Douglas analysis); Vasquez v. Cnty. of L.A.,
349 F.3d 634, 641 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Employees in supervisory positions are gener-
ally deemed not to be similarly situated to lower level employees.”); Little v. Repub-
lic Refining Co., 924 F.2d 93, 97 (5th Cir. 1991) (requiring plaintiff to show
preferential treatment was given to younger employee under “nearly identical
circumstances”).
156. Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 641.
157. Hawn v. Exec. Jet Mgmt., Inc., 615 F.3d 1151, 1157 (9th Cir. 2010) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).
158. Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1091 (11th Cir. 2004).
159. Burke-Fowler, 447 F.3d at 1323.
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However, another avenue exists for certain types of cases where com-
parator evidence is lacking.  A handful of courts (and several scholars)
have argued that comparator evidence “is not required by Title VII juris-
prudence”160 in cases of family responsibility discrimination (FRD), where
plaintiffs sue their employers for discriminating against them based on
their responsibilities to care for family members.161  In those situations,
comparative evidence is difficult, if not impossible.162  In fact, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) recently endorsed FRD
discrimination as a legitimate cause of action under Title VII.163  But
again, there are limitations to FRD claims as applied to female hourly
workers losing out on hours to their male counterparts.  Even FRD claims
must prove that the workers suffered an adverse employment action be-
cause of their sex, on top of proving that gender stereotypes operated to
their disadvantage.  While sex stereotype evidence is helpful in showing
pretext, hourly workers will have difficulty proving the prima facie case to
begin with.
c. Scheduling Shortfalls Affecting Female Part-Time Workers Is Not a
“Choice”
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that “schedule
changes matter to mothers,”164 most courts recognize part-time work, in
the scanty handful of cases that do examine it, as a “choice” made by wo-
men to balance work and family.  This “flexibility” is attractive to family
caregivers who need a workplace that can accommodate their responsibili-
ties, and courts are clear that choosing a part-time, flexible path is not
protected by antidiscrimination law because workers place themselves on
160. Joan C. Williams & Stephanie Bornstein, The Evolution of “Fred”: Family
Responsibilities Discrimination and Developments in the Law of Stereotyping and Implicit
Bias, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1311, 1350–51 (2008).
161. See Joan C. Williams & Cynthia Thomas Calvert, Introduction, in WORKLIFE
LAW’S GUIDE TO FAMILY RESPONSIBILITIES DISCRIMINATION (2006) (discussing family
responsibilities discrimination (FRD)).  FRD includes pregnancy discrimination,
discrimination against mothers (and in more limited circumstances, fathers), and
discrimination against workers with other family caregiving responsibilities.  FRD
cases got a shot in the arm when the EEOC issued its 2007 Enforcement Guidance
on caregiver discrimination. See EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, NOTICE NO.
915.002, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: UNLAWFUL DISPARATE TREATMENT OF WORKERS
WITH CAREGIVING RESPONSIBILITIES (2007), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/poli
cy/docs/caregiving.html [hereinafter EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE].
162. See Williams & Calvert, supra note 161 (describing difficulty in obtaining
comparative evidence).
163. See EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 161 (“Employment deci-
sions based on stereotypes violate Title VII.”).
164. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 69 (2006) (“A
schedule change in an employee’s work schedule may make little difference to
many workers, but may matter enormously to a young mother with school-age
children.”).
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such a path deliberatively for the flexibility it can provide.165  Sex stereo-
types play an important role in the courts’ view that part-time work is a
“choice” that Title VII does not protect.  Legal scholars, such as Professor
Martha Chamallas, have persuasively argued that the inferior status of
part-time work “stems in part from sex discrimination.”166
This line of reasoning muddies the water for future scheduling dis-
crimination cases because the courts fail to differentiate between workers
for whom part-time work is voluntary versus involuntary (meaning they
want more hours or full-time status but are denied from those positions or
hours).  Courts continue to insist that part-time status is a life-style choice
of women looking for flexible work conditions.167
But, as witnessed in Parts II and III, (and what is not currently recog-
nized by the courts is that) for many part-time female workers, part-time
status is not a “choice” and in fact, many would take additional hours for
added compensation if available.  Social science researchers have convinc-
ingly shown that women are disproportionately affected by inconsistent
scheduling practices, and would choose more hours if offered.168  Because
they work without any minimum hours guarantee, unrequested reduction
of hours is not legally protected.
Moreover, any forced “flexibility” comes at a high price when one
considers the need for stable schedules to allow for planning of child care,
education, and other part-time work.  Instead, it is the employers who ben-
efit from flexible scheduling.  In scheduling part-time hourly workers, em-
ployers have “a great deal of built-in flexibility to adjust hours downward
in part-time jobs,”169 and can do so without fear of Title VII exposure,
even when they “flex out” mainly women because work in a part-time job is
seen as a “choice” women make.
In sum, disparate treatment is a viable avenue for redress, not only
based on the current legal precedent where evidence in discriminatory
animus based on family caregiving responsibilities is actionable, but also
for female hourly workers whose main claim is that they suffer hours ineq-
165. See Capruso v. Hartford Fin. Serv. Grp., Inc., No. 01 Civ. 4250 (RLC),
2003 WL 1872653, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2003) (“Title VII does not prohibit
discrimination based solely on one’s choice to work part time.”).
166. Chamallas, supra note 106, at 711.
167. See Meyer v. United Air Lines, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 874, 877 (N.D. Ill. 1997)
(“As valid as these concerns may be, they still are ‘personal reasons unrelated to
the job.’” (citing U.S. v. City of Chicago, 853 F.2d 572, 579 (7th Cir. 1988))); Brady
v. Thurston Motor Lines, Inc., 753 F.2d 1269, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985) (standing for
proposition that discrimination is not present “when the quit is motivated by per-
sonal reasons unrelated to the job or as a matter of personal convenience”).
168. See Schedule Flexibility, supra note 16, at 310 (“Even if workers are grateful
for the opportunity to restrict their work hours, they may not be fully aware that
they risk an earnings penalty when they restrict their availability for work, and if
they are aware, their family responsibilities may limit their ability to choose other-
wise.”); McCrate, supra note 10 (providing empirical evidence to demonstrate that
women are disproportionately affected by inconsistent scheduling practices).
169. Lambert, Passing the Buck, supra note 44, at 1214.
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uities and “undertime” in disparate proportion to their male counterparts.
It requires, however, specific evidence of discriminatory motive because of
the workers’ gender, which is a difficult evidentiary hurdle.
2. Disparate Impact Theory
If some female part-time workers find it difficult to prove that manag-
ers intentionally schedule female hourly workers differently because of
their sex or make decisions influenced by sex stereotypes, might schedul-
ing practices violate Title VII’s other theory—one that does not require
intentional discrimination, but instead, bans practices that result in unin-
tended, but very real, disparities for women?
In contrast to the deliberate or intentional (if sometimes uncon-
scious) discrimination at the heart of disparate treatment, disparate im-
pact theory prohibits employer practices that negatively impact protected
classes, including women, regardless of their intent.  The Supreme Court
in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.170 first approved the theory in 1971,171 and the
Court continued to endorse the analysis in subsequent cases.172  A sea
change occurred in 1989, when the Court changed course and severely
restricted the disparate impact analysis in Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio.173  Congress quickly rejected Wards Cove in the Civil Rights Act of
1991, by adopting statutory language defining the burden of proof under
disparate impact theory and restoring the burden-shifting to a pre-Wards
Cove standard.174  However, Congress did codify the “specific practice” re-
quirement, stating that the plaintiff must demonstrate that “each particu-
lar challenged employment practice causes a disparate impact.”175
170. 401 U.S. 424 (1970).
171. See id. at 424–31, 436 (disapproving of employer’s use of high school
diploma requirement and written tests that had severe racial disparate impact
where employer had not evaluated whether these requirements were “reasonable
measure of job performance”).
172. See, e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 989–91 (1988)
(holding that disparate impact analysis can be used to challenge subjective deci-
sion-making processes that produce significant racially disparate impact); Al-
bemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 427–34 (1975) (applying Griggs to
disapprove employer’s use of written tests with severe racial disparate impact with-
out considering whether tests measured job performance).
173. 490 U.S. 642, 658–59 (1989) (holding that employers need only offer
evidence of “business justification” for challenged business practice and that plain-
tiffs in disparate impact cases have burden of proof in rebutting employer’s prof-
fered business justification).
174. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34 (2012) (providing rules regarding applicable
burdens in employment discrimination cases).
175. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(B)(i).  However, the 1991 Act did provide a nar-
row exception to the specific practice requirement.  For cases where the plaintiff
“can demonstrate to the court that the elements of a respondent’s decisionmaking
process are not capable of separation for analysis, the decisionmaking process may
be analyzed as one employment practice.” Id.
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Proving disparate impact, although returned to its originally intended
analysis, remains a daunting challenge to plaintiffs.176  It requires both
sophisticated statistical analysis to show disparate effects and identification
of the “specific practice” causing these effects.177  Legal commentators
agree that although vitally important in combating “invidious acts of
prejudiced decision-making,” today, it is “very rare for plaintiffs other than
highly sophisticated and well-funded litigants, such as the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice, to prevail under Title VII on a disparate impact the-
ory.”178  This remains especially true for low-wage hourly workers, because
first, the statistical analysis is expensive and out of reach for most low-wage
workers absent well-funded impact litigation, and second, the scheduling
practices of employers in service industries are not likely to be a “specific
practice” causing the effects, as required under current law.
a. Statistical Proof (and Class Litigation) Should Be Made Available to
Low-Wage Hourly Workers
With regard to scheduling, to prove discrimination under this theory,
plaintiffs would have to provide statistically significant evidence that more
hours and preferred schedules were allocated to male hourly workers over
female hourly workers in a given worksite.  First, statistical analysis re-
quired to demonstrate the disparate effects is both hard to prove and not
cheap to come by.  Proving discrimination through statistical proof re-
quires exacting evidence to a statistically significant degree demonstrating
disparity.  In order to have probative value, statistics need not reach “the
level of scientific certainty,” but must be of “legal significance.”179  Such
statistics must take into account both the appropriate labor pool and the
significant nondiscriminatory factors, typically through a multiple regres-
sion analysis.180
Any multiple regression analysis that must take into account the rele-
vant labor pool (of the particular service industry job market) and other
nondiscriminatory factors (such as preferences, requests, seniority, and ex-
perience) is set up to fail because of the high proof standard and because
176. See Katerina Linos, Path Dependence in Discrimination Law: Employment
Cases in the United States and the European Union, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 115, 142–43
(2010) (describing difficulties demonstrating disparate impact); Selmi, supra note
131, at 734–43 (analyzing difficulty of proving disparate impact cases).
177. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 239–40 (2005) (holding that
plaintiffs failed to identify with sufficient precision exact “practice” that caused
disparate impact on basis of age in city’s formula for raising salaries of junior pub-
lic safety officers to compete with other jurisdictions).
178. Susan D. Carle, A Social Movement History of Title VII Disparate Impact Analy-
ses, 63 FLA. L. REV. 251, 257–58 (2011).
179. See Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 400 (1986) (noting that plaintiff’s
burden is to “prove discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence,” not with
“scientific certainty”).
180. See, e.g., Lavin-McElency v. Marist Coll., 239 F.3d 476, 482 (2d Cir. 2001)
(“It is undisputed that multiple regression analysis . . . is a scientifically valid statisti-
cal technique for identifying discrimination.”).
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of the multiple factors involved in managerial scheduling decisions.181
Moreover, even if that statistical proof was likely to be found, obtaining it
is costly and outside the resources of most hourly workers.  The statistical
analysis is usually drawn by an expert retained by a lawyer, who passes the
costs on to the defendant (if successful) or absorbs the costs (if unsuccess-
ful).182  That necessarily means that individual litigation of disparate im-
pact claims is nearly impossible because lawyers are not willing to take on
that magnitude of risk unless they can aggregate claims, making class ac-
tions the only realistic avenue of redress.  Courts, including the Supreme
Court, recognize this, acknowledging the importance of aggregate litiga-
tion as the only means of relief where a plaintiff’s claim is too small eco-
nomically to support individual litigation and “private attorney generals”
are needed to diffuse the costs and risks among the class.183
But class actions have come under attack in recent years, and as a
result, savvy plaintiffs’ lawyers wanting to tackle untried legal theories are
likely to be thin on the ground.  First, in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,184
the Supreme Court heightened the standard for commonality in class ac-
181. In fact, having a significant amount of discretion in making decisions in
workers’ scheduling is an explicit element in what makes one a manager for pur-
poses of the FLSA. See Thomas v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 506 F.3d 496, 507
(6th Cir. 2007) (providing that scheduling is important managerial function).
182. See Nantiya Ruan, Bringing Sense to Incentives: An Examination of Incentive
Payments to Named Plaintiffs in Employment Discrimination Class Actions, 10 EMP. RTS.
& EMP. POL’Y J. 395, 396–400 (2006) (addressing risk to plaintiffs’ attorneys and
named plaintiffs).
183. See Nantiya Ruan, What’s Left to Remedy Wage Theft?: How Arbitration Man-
dates That Bar Class Actions Impact Low-Wage Workers, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1103,
1118 (2012) [hereinafter Ruan, Remedy Wage Theft] (“The courts, including the
U.S. Supreme Court, routinely recognize the importance of aggregate litigation
because it often remains the only means of judicial relief where a plaintiff’s claim is
too small economically to support individual litigation.”); see also Amchem Prods.,
Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (“The policy at the very core of the class
action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide
the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her
rights.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472
U.S. 797, 809 (1985) (“Class actions . . . permit the plaintiffs to pool claims which
would be uneconomical to litigate individually.”); Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v.
Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980) (“Where it is not economically feasible to obtain
relief within the traditional framework of a multiplicity of small individual suits for
damages, aggrieved persons may be without any effective redress unless they may
employ the class-action device.”); Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 10 Civ.
6950 LBSJCF, 2011 WL 2671813, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 7, 2011) (“In this case, the
plaintiff would be foreclosed from bringing her pattern or practice claim . . . by
the practicality of economic pressures limiting the value of her claim compared
with the cost of prosecuting it . . . .”); Mascol v. E & L Transp., Inc., CV-03-3343
CPS, 2005 WL 1541045, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. June 29, 2005) (holding “the class action
form is superior to alternative methods of adjudicating this controversy” because
claims were negative value); Iliadis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 922 A.2d 710, 725 (N.J.
2007) (“Because of the very real likelihood that class members will not bring indi-
vidual actions, class actions are ‘often the superior form of adjudication when the
claims of the individual class members are small.’”).
184. 131 S. Ct. 2554 (2011).
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tion certification, making it more difficult for plaintiffs to prove class com-
monalities when separate, independent decision-makers are involved.185
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s certification of Title VII
gender discrimination claims based on a theory that individual managers’
unbridled discretionary decision-making was influenced by impermissible
gender stereotyping, resulting in statistically significant pay disparities.186
The Dukes Court found that the commonality requirement was not satis-
fied on the record before it and held that to satisfy Rule 23(a)(2), plain-
tiffs only need to identify one common question of law or fact, but that
question must be central to the validity of each class member’s claim.187
With regard to statistical proof, the Court, in dicta, cast doubt on the lower
court’s conclusion that Daubert did not apply to expert testimony at the
class certification stage.188
Second, in Behrend v. Comcast Corp.,189 the Supreme Court revisited
the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry in the context of damages, hold-
ing that “the proper standard for evaluating certification” requires a show-
ing “that damages are capable of measurement on a classwide basis.”190  In
Comcast, an antitrust class action, the district court and Third Circuit did
not credit defendant’s challenge to plaintiffs’ regression model because
“those arguments would also be pertinent to the merits determination.”191
The Supreme Court reversed class certification, holding that the Third
Circuit should not have “simply concluded that respondents provided a
method to measure and quantify damages on a classwide basis,” without
deciding “whether the methodology [was] a just and reasonable inference
or speculative.”192
Lastly, in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,193 the Supreme Court ex-
amined the viability of mandatory arbitration clauses that prohibit class
actions, and determined that mandating individual arbitration is consis-
185. See id. (providing that evidence of gender-based decision-making by su-
pervisors “does not lead to the conclusion that every employee in a company using
a system of discretion has such a claim in common”).
186. See id. at 2547 (describing circumstances giving rise to litigation).
187. See id. at 2551 (“Their claims must depend upon a common conten-
tion—for example, the assertion of discriminatory bias on the part of the same
supervisor.”).
188. See id. at 2553–54 (“The District Court concluded that Daubert did not
apply to expert testimony at the certification stage of class-action proceedings.  We
doubt that is so, but even if properly considered, [the expert’s] testimony does
nothing to advance respondents’ case.”).
189. 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013).
190. Id. at 1432.
191. Id. at 1433.
192. Id. at 1433 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis
added).
193. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
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tent with federal labor policy.194  The plaintiffs in Concepcion brought a
class consumer fraud suit, but the defendant moved to compel arbitration,
which included a class waiver.195  The Court upheld the arbitration clause,
including the class waiver, finding that “[a]rbitration is poorly suited to
the higher stakes of class litigation” because, in part, “class arbitration
greatly increases risk to defendants.”196  As one of this Article’s authors
has explained, changing the forum from public litigation to private arbi-
tration and prohibiting aggregation of claims incentivizes unscrupulous
employers to profit from the work of hourly workers by closing “the doors
of justice on low-wage workers.”197
Together, this recent litany of Supreme Court class action decisions
reflects the growing judicial hostility towards class treatment.  As Justice
Kagan recently recognized in a dissenting opinion: “To a hammer, every-
thing looks like a nail.  And to a Court bent on diminishing the usefulness
of Rule 23, everything looks like a class action, ready to be dismantled.”198
Such judicial hostility casts doubt on the likelihood of success of worker
class actions moving forward.  Given the importance that aggregating
claims has for low-wage workers, this hostility has significant
consequences.
b. Recognizing Scheduling as a Specific Practice
Disparate impact claims brought by hourly workers for scheduling dis-
parities might fail under the specific practice requirement because of the
plaintiffs’ inability to show a specific employment practice that disadvan-
tages female part-time workers.199  In order to make a successful disparate
194. See id. at 1748 (“Requiring the availability of classwide arbitration inter-
feres with fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsis-
tent with the FAA.”).
195. See id. at 1744 (describing circumstances giving rise to litigation).
196. Id. at 1751–52 (providing reasons why arbitration is poorly suited for
class litigation).
197. Ruan, Remedy Wage Theft, supra note 183, at 1105 (listing factors that dis-
enfranchise low-wage workers).  This argument is even more important given the
recent Supreme Court decision of American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant,
where, in an antitrust class action, the Court declined to apply the “effective-vindi-
cation rule,” that recognizes when an arbitration mandate is a barrier to the vindi-
cation of meritorious federal claims, requiring it insulates wrongdoers from
liability. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2320 (2013)
(Kagan, J., dissenting).  As Justice Kagan noted in her dissent, “the majority disre-
gards our decisions’ central tenet: An arbitration clause may not thwart federal
law, irrespective of exactly how it does so.  Because the Court today prevents the
effective vindication of federal statutory rights,” joined by Justices Ginsberg and
Breyer. Id. at 2313.
198. Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2320.
199. See Brown v. Super K-Mart, No. 98 C 3498, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9525, at
*13 (N.D. Ill. June 14, 1999) (finding that full-time and part-time employees are
not similarly situated); LaRocco v. Nalco Chem. Co., No. 96 CV 3980, 1999 WL
199251, at *13 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 1999) (holding that full-time and part-time em-
ployees are not comparable); Schallop v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Law, 20 F. Supp. 2d
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impact claim, plaintiffs are required to show “each particular challenged
employment practice causes a disparate impact.”200  This exacting stan-
dard results in many disparate impact cases failing at the proof stage be-
cause the plaintiff could not identify a specific employment practice that
linked statistical differences to sex.  “For example, employees who base
disparate impact claims on managers’ preferences201 or on informal prac-
tices202 as opposed to company policy often see their claims fail because of
the specific practice requirement.”203
With regard to earnings penalties for part-time work as compared to
full-time work, courts analyzing the specific practice requirement will
likely require that part-time workers make a specific showing of particular
scheduling practices with statistical proof to have caused the disparate im-
pact.  Allowing managerial subjectivity in decisions regarding scheduling
could be seen as an informal practice unable to have redress under this
theory.  Moreover, courts may require that the workers be similarly situ-
ated to other part-time workers in their claims.  For example, in Payne v.
Huntington Union Free School District,204 the federal district court held that a
part-time, temporary employee must compare herself with other part-time,
temporary employees, and not full-time employees, in granting summary
judgment against her.205
In the case of a female part-time worker comparing herself to other
male part-time workers in claiming a disparate impact in scheduling
shortfalls, the plaintiff would also have an uphill battle.  She would have to
necessarily rely upon managerial preferences and informal practices be-
cause few workplaces have a formalized corporate policy that can be suc-
cessfully challenged under this theory.206  Instead, managers would likely
384, 403 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) (“Comparing women working part-time with men work-
ing full-time provides no guidance because it is impossible to discern from those
statistics whether any disparity is based on gender or on part-time status, a classifi-
cation not protected.”); EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264, 1285
(N.D. Ill. 1986) (requiring “a specific, facially neutral practice of the employer
which disproportionately excludes members of a protected group”).
200. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(B)(i) (2012).
201. See, e.g., Gullet v. Town of Normal, 156 F. App’x 837, 842 (7th Cir. 2005)
(holding that hiring male full-time street maintenance worker from all-male waste
division was not company policy but rather manager’s preference, and thus female
plaintiff did not establish specific employment practice).
202. See, e.g., Mathis v. Wachovia, 509 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1143 (N.D. Fla. 2007)
(holding that absence of policy to investigate apparent racial inequities is not con-
sidered company policy sufficient to meet specific employment practice
requirement).
203. Linos, supra note 176, at 142 (noting frequent failure of disparate impact
claims based on informal practices or manager preferences).
204. 219 F. Supp. 2d 273 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
205. See id. at 281 (stating court’s holding).
206. Any theory that individualized decision-making is a specific corporate
policy in violation of Title VII would probably fail, given the theory’s demise in
Wal-Mart v. Dukes.  For a further discussion of Wal-Mart v. Dukes, see supra notes
184–88.
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successfully assert that they used other preferences (such as reliability, ex-
perience, and seniority) to defeat the specific practice claim.  For exam-
ple, in Gullet v. Town of Normal,207 a circuit court held that hiring a male
full-time street maintenance worker from an all-male waste division was
not a company policy but rather a manager’s preference, and thus the
female plaintiff did not establish a specific employment practice.208  Ac-
cordingly, disparate impact claims will be an unlikely source of protection
for scheduling discrimination and earnings penalties until the courts rec-
ognize that scheduling is a specific employer practice with significant con-
sequences for workers, and that procedural barriers should be breached if
they prevent the vindication of substantive rights.209
V. REMEDYING THE SCHEDULING SHORTFALLS AND
RECOGNIZING HOURS EQUITY
The pay inequity between women and men is not just about a woman
making a percentage of every dollar that a man makes.  In today’s
workforce, where nearly two-thirds of the part-time workforce are women,
the pay gap is exacerbated by both the earnings penalty of part-time work
(where part-time workers make less per hour than their full-time counter-
parts) and female part-time workers suffering fewer scheduled hours be-
cause of discriminatory sex stereotypes at play.  With only minor
reconceptualizing, legal protection for female hourly workers can be more
comprehensive and effective.  But if courts fail to incorporate scheduling
shortfalls into their understanding of current antidiscrimination laws, this
Part suggests statutory fixes to specifically address these important issues
and highlights the need for renewed advocacy for part-time low-wage
workers.  Three potential avenues to address and combat these underde-
veloped components of the gender pay gap are identified below: statutory
redress; community organizing and collective action; and renewed public
regulation and enforcement.
A. Existing Legal Remedies and Statutory Fixes
Addressing the pay inequities of female hourly workers is unlikely to
enjoy much success without legal remedies available to combat the dis-
crimination they face.  The federal statutes addressed in Part IV can be
207. 156 F. App’x 837 (7th Cir. 2005).
208. See id. at 842 (stating court’s holding).
209. Courts have recognized that procedural rules that prohibit the adjudica-
tion of substantive rights ought to be amended to allow such claims, but those
cases are in the clear minority and are often overturned. See, e.g., In re Am. Express
Merchs.’ Litig., 667 F.3d 204, 218 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that class action waiver
in agreement between American Express and merchants “would grant Amex de
facto immunity from antitrust liability by removing the plaintiffs’ only reasonably
feasible means of recovery”); In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., 634 F.3d 187, 199
(2d Cir. 2011) (same); In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., 554 F.3d 300, 320 (2d Cir.
2009) (same).
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employed more expansively in impact litigation efforts, while others need
amending to fully represent female hourly workers’ needs.
First, existing worker rights laws could be a source of redress for
hourly workers if they were able to find private or government attorneys
open to challenging harmful scheduling practices.  At the state level, re-
porting pay laws can assist part-time workers with additional wages when
sent home or called in to work, while also educating and encouraging em-
ployers to adopt fairer scheduling practices.210
At the federal level, impact litigation challenging the disparate treat-
ment of female hourly workers in the preferential scheduling of hours to
male workers should be brought under Title VII.  As explained in Part IV,
such an attempt might fail unless courts are persuaded by social science
and other evidence that sex stereotyping remains rampant in today’s work-
place.  Similarly, disparate impact challenges under Title VII to the corpo-
rate practice of paying full-time workers more per hour than part-time
workers could be challenged.  Innovative and well-funded legal advocates
that have the resources to retain expert statistical analysis and data collec-
tion might be able to successfully argue that the practice of paying part-
time workers less per hour for the same work, while non-discriminatory on
its face, has a disparate effect on female hourly workers.  These suits would
be challenging, but with the right clients, evidence, resources, and creative
lawyering, these impact litigations could move the law in the direction of
hourly worker protection.
Second, legislative efforts to address the pay gap specifically, and part-
time work generally, would have a tremendous effect on pay inequities.
The FLSA is due for a face-lift.  Recent legislative efforts to amend the
FLSA have been solely focused on eliminating and curtailing overtime pre-
mium pay.  The most recent attempt is the confusingly named “Working
Families Flexibility Act,” which would allow employers to pay their workers
nothing extra for overtime work, other than the potentially empty promise
of compensatory time that can only be used at the employer’s discre-
tion.211  Instead, the efforts to amend the FLSA should specifically address
the unfair labor practices of disparate hours allocation and scheduling
fluctuations that negatively impact female hourly workers.
Legislative efforts could also focus on part-time work more generally.
Prior scholars have recognized this hole.  For example, Professor Nicole
Porter suggests that Congress enact a “Part-Time Parity Act” to “alleviate
the marginalization of part-time workers” by mandating that employers
pay part-time workers proportional wages and fringe benefits at a propor-
210. See Alexander, Haley-Lock & Ruan, supra note 86 (detailing “call-in” and
“send-home” pay laws).
211. See H.R. 1406, 113th Cong. (2013), available at http://www.govtrack.us/
congress/bills/113/hr1406/text  (“An employee may receive, in accordance with
this subsection and in lieu of monetary overtime compensation, compensatory
time off at a rate not less than one and one-half hours for each hour of employ-
ment for which overtime compensation is required by this section.”).
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tional rate as full-time employees performing equal work.212  Such legisla-
tive efforts might not ultimately be successful, but even so, such efforts
would raise public awareness about the pay inequities entrenched in our
workplaces.  One way to raise awareness would be for the federal govern-
ment to update the 2001 Current Population Survey to provide meaning-
ful, updated statistics on work hours and the desirability of more hours for
part-time workers.213
Lastly, legal remedies are meaningless if low-wage hourly workers are
unable to access them.  For hourly workers unable to attain attorney repre-
sentation for their individual claims, aggregating them with other workers
is often the only way to have them addressed.214  It is only through com-
bining hourly workers’ relatively small damage award with multiple simi-
larly-situated workers, do class action attorneys have an incentive to
become “private attorney[s] general” combating discriminatory workplace
harms.215  As class action practice comes under greater judicial scrutiny
and the legal standards for class certification become more difficult to
meet (as outlined in Part IV), fewer private plaintiffs’ attorneys are willing
to risk the high costs of these cases.  Impact litigation nonprofits (such as
the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, the Impact Fund, and National Employ-
ment Law Project) are needed to fill that hole in pushing employers to
redress pay inequities.
B. Legal Mobilization: The Call to Worker Centers, Worker Unions,
and Collective Action
The lack of legal rules that address problems of scheduling shortfalls
and “the withdrawal of government’s hands in the labor market”216 create
significant challenges for workers.  As discussed earlier, a significant body
212. Porter, supra note 113, at 828–35 (outlining facets of Part-Time Parity
Act to address caregiving discrimination faced by working mothers).
213. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Contingent and
Alternative Employment Arrangements (Feb. 2001), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/
history/conemp_05242001.txt (detailing labor statistics from February 1999 to
February 2001).
214. See generally Nantiya Ruan, Facilitating Wage Theft: How Courts Use Procedu-
ral Rules to Undermine Substantive Rights of Low-Wage Workers, 63 VAND. L. REV. 727
(2010) (recognizing need for, and advocating, collective litigation for under-
represented groups, such as low-wage workers, to ensure adequate legal remedies);
Ruan, Remedy Wage Theft, supra note 183, at 1115 (“Given the financial barriers to
bringing individual private causes of action, aggregating low-wage workers’ claims
has been the primary source of private enforcement of wage theft.”).
215. See James M. Fraser, Note, Opt-in Class Actions Under the FLSA, EPA, and
ADEA: What Does It Mean to Be “Similarly Situated”?, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 95, 99,
102–03 (2004) (discussing benefits of aggregating claims); see also Holt v. Rite Aid
Corp., 333 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1269 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (“Collective action treat-
ment . . . reflects a policy in favor of judicial economy by which ‘the judicial system
benefits by efficient resolution in one proceeding of common issues of law and fact
arising from the same alleged discriminatory activity.’” (quoting Hoffmann-La-
Roche, Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 170 (1989))).
216. Bernhardt, supra note 51, at 356.
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of scholarship describes how workplace law has become increasingly un-
friendly to workers over the past decade.  As importantly, the agencies
charged with enforcing workplace law are underfunded and understaffed.
In the ten years prior to 2007, the number of wage and hour investigators
employed by the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) decreased by more
than twenty percent, and the total number of federal wage enforcement
actions decreased by almost forty percent.  Although the Obama Adminis-
tration added 350 investigators in 2010, the number of personnel devoted
to investigation falls short when compared to the 130 million workers cov-
ered.  State enforcement is similarly constrained.  The Policy Matters Ohio
study of state enforcement of wage and hour laws calculated that there is
one wage and hour investigator for every 146,000 workers.217  Florida, for
example, has only six DOL wage and hour investigators for the entire state
and no state equivalent to a DOL to investigate wage and hour com-
plaints.218  Without resources, workplace regulators rely on workers to
complain.219  This is simply not enough in low-wage workplaces where
“the threat of employer retaliation is too great to depend on individual
workers to carry the weight.”220
Equally important (albeit beyond the scope of this Article) are larger,
cultural and discursive frameworks for understanding the concepts of la-
bor, work, and the employment relationship itself that may inhibit work-
place complaints.  Professors Vallas and Prener locate the current
precariousness of work within a “culture of enterprise,” that combines the
dual rhetoric of self-fulfillment and individual responsibility.221  They sug-
gest that workers have internalized the concept of “responsibilization,” or
“the obligation of perfecting themselves, and of bringing out the full value
of their human capital, the better to take advantage of the opportunities
that exist for the entrepreneurial self.”222  Placing responsibilization on
the shoulders of employees in a context of unilateral employer control
over the timing of and production of work most certainly works to the
advantage of employers.223  Taking on the problems as their own in this
217. See ZACH SCHILLER & SARAH DECARLO, POLICY MATTERS OHIO, INVESTIGAT-
ING WAGE THEFT: A SURVEY OF THE STATES 2 (2010), available at http://www.policy-
mattersohio.org/investigating-wage-theft-a-survey-of-the-states (providing statistics
to reach conclusion of one wage and hour investigator for every 146,000 workers).
218. See CYNTHIA S. HERNANDEZ & CAROL STEPICK, RESEARCH INST. ON SOC. &
ECON. POL’Y CTR. FOR LABOR RESEARCH AND STUDIES FLA. INT’L UNIV., WAGE THEFT:
AN ECONOMIC DRAIN TO FLORIDA 6–7 (2012), available at http://urbanhabitat.org/
node/6759.
219. Cf. WEIL, supra note 33, at 8 (“Compounding these resource limitations
is the fact that a significant percentage of [Wage and Hour Division] investigations
arise from worker complaints.” (citation omitted)).
220. Bernhardt, supra note 51, at 363.
221. Steven Vallas & Christopher Prener, Dualism, Job Polarization, and the So-
cial Construction of Precarious Work, 39 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 331, 347–48 (2012).
222. Id. at 343.
223. In her analysis of the Family and Medical Leave Act, Catherine Albiston
reminds us that the time norms and production schedules we take for granted
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way, workers may be less inclined to formally complain or to join worker
associations that might collectively negotiate for them.
Tapping into the current structure of worker centers can be one road
of advocacy for female hourly workers.  Worker centers are “community-
based and community-led organizations that engage in a combination of
service, advocacy, and organizing to provide support to low-wage work-
ers.”224  Located in many urban areas,225 worker centers already are or-
ganizing and collaborating with other nonprofit advocacy and government
bodies to advocate for important wage issues.  “The National Employment
Law Project, Interfaith Worker Justice, Make the Road in New York, the
Employment Law Center, and the UCLA Center for Labor Research and
Education in Los Angeles are a few examples of successful organizations
that are already working to provide support for low-wage workers.”226
Thus far, worker centers have focused attention on the pressing need
of immigrant worker populations, who suffer a disproportionate amount
of wage abuses, including wage theft and unsafe work conditions.227  How-
ever, worker centers are already beginning to partner with other commu-
nity nonprofits to address systemic harms, rather than singularly focusing
on individual cases and needs.228  Centers across the country are celebrat-
ing great successes in drafting and helping to enact local legislation to
were the product of historical contests over the meaning of work. See CATHERINE
ALBISTON, INSTITUTIONAL INEQUALITY AND THE MOBILIZATION OF THE FAMILY AND
MEDICAL LEAVE ACT (2010); see also Rachel Arnow-Richman, Incenting Flexibility: The
Relationship Between Public Law and Voluntary Action in Enhancing Work/Life Balance,
42 CONN. L. REV. 1081, 1085 (2010) (“[E]mployees in an at-will system remain
subject at all times to employers’ unilateral changes in work structure—a reality
that may more heavily burden caregivers whose personal responsibilities are likely
to be schedule-dependent.”).
224. Janice Fine, Worker Centers: Organizing Communities at the Edge of the Dream,
50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 417, 419 (2005–2006).
225. In fact, one study estimated that in 2006, there were 139 worker centers
in the United States. See Rebecca J. Livengood, Organizing for Structural Change: The
Potential and Promise of Worker Centers, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 325, 328 (2013)
(citing Fine, supra note 224, at 421).
226. Ruan, Remedy Wage Theft, supra note 183, at 1142; see also KIM BOBO, WAGE
THEFT IN AMERICA 103–16 (2d ed. 2011) (detailing organizations that help low-
wage workers fight wage theft).
227. See generally JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS—THE FIGHT FOR
IMMIGRANT RIGHTS (2005) (discussing working conditions for immigrant workers
and worker centers that advocate for improved working conditions and higher
wages); Jennifer Gordon, We Make the Road by Walking: Immigrant Workers, The Work-
place Project, and the Struggle for Social Change, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407 (1995)
(addressing problems faced by immigrant workers on Long Island, failure of gov-
ernment and private groups to confront problems, and presenting new model as
alternative); Emily Stein, The Workplace Project, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 607
(2005–2006) (analyzing “The Workplace Project,” an independent center that or-
ganizes members to combat mistreatment of immigrant workers).
228. See Fine, supra note 224, at 419 (noting partnerships between immigrant
worker centers and African American communities); Livengood, supra note 225
(arguing that worker centers should shift focus away from individual cases and
toward structural changes).
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combat wage abuses,229 and participating in impact litigation for worker
rights.230  Worker centers are primed to collaborate with women’s rights
organizations, such as 9to5 (advocates for working families),231 to advo-
cate for hourly workers, which could be an important tool in the fight for
equal pay.
Moreover, unions are another potential source of part-time worker
advocacy.  Today’s labor scholars study the unions’ struggle to rebrand
themselves and make themselves relevant in the twenty-first century,232
given the declining rate of union membership.233  While the traditional
union structure might not meet the needs of part-time workers, “next wave
organizing”234 could include part-time and hourly worker advocacy, en-
couraging employers to provide equal hourly rates to full and part-time
workers, as well as parity among female and male hourly worker schedules.
Workers themselves are organizing outside the traditional union frame-
work to bring attention to workplace fairness issues.
For example, established in 2011, Our Walmart is a worker-led organi-
zation advocating for change in the working conditions at Walmart
stores.235  A cornerstone of Our Walmart’s action is a Declaration of Re-
spect that calls on the Walmart Corporation to “publicly commit to re-
spect” and “listen to its Associates and to recognize freedom of association
229. See Fine, supra note 224, at 436 (citing New York and other legislative
successes).
230. See Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, EEOC Sues
JBS Swift for Religious and National Origin Discrimination in Colorado and Ne-
braska (Aug. 31, 2010), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/re
lease/8-31-10.cfm (announcing lawsuit filed by EEOC on behalf of low-wage work-
ers in religious discrimination class action).
231. See 9TO5: WINNING JUSTICE FOR WORKING WOMEN, www.9to5.org (last vis-
ited Nov. 9, 2013) (advocating for women in workplace).
232. See generally Fred Feinstein, Renewing and Maintaining Union Vitality: New
Approaches to Union Growth, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 337 (2005) (addressing ap-
proaches and strategies used by unions to increase membership); Charles Heck-
scher, Organizations, Movements, and Networks, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 313 (2005)
(arguing that labor unions must adapt to evolving nature of employer organiza-
tions and movements to succeed); Jim Pope, Next Wave Organizing and the Shift to a
New Paradigm of Labor Law, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 515 (2005) (discussing paradigm
shift of business organizations and necessity of labor organizations to follow suit).
233. In 2012, the rate of union membership in the private sector dropped
from 6.9% to 6.6%; the combined rate of American workers (public and private)
belonging to a union was 11.3%, down from 11.8% the previous year and the low-
est figure ever since the Bureau of Labor Statistics started collecting the data in
1983, when the rate was 20.1%. See Economic News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor,
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Membership News Release (Jan. 23, 2013),
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.htm (providing union membership
statistics).
234. See generally Seth Harris, Don’t Mourn—Reorganize!  An Introduction to the
Next Wave Organizing Symposium Issue, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 303 (2005) (discussing
“next wave organizing”).
235. OUR WALMART: ORGANIZATION UNITED FOR RESPECT AT WALMART, http:/
/forrespect.org (last visited Nov. 9, 2013).
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and freedom of speech.”236  It asks for increased wages (thirteen dollars
an hour) and, importantly, dependable and predictable schedules, as well
as affordable health care that would ensure that “no Associate has to rely
on government assistance.”  According to its members, these changes
would allow workers to succeed in their careers, the company to succeed
in business, and customers to receive great service and value.  In October
2012, Our Walmart members went on strike, a first in the company’s fifty-
year history.
Hourly workers, as non-unionized workers, can also rely upon labor
laws to protect their right to act collectively to negotiate and advocate with
their employers for fair scheduling practices and hourly rates.  The Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (NLRA) protects all workers, not just unionized
employees, from employer action that impinges upon their right to con-
certed activity,237 which might protect hourly workers in a variety of con-
texts.  For example, the NLRA has been found to protect workers who
communicate on social media sites from adverse action by their employ-
ers.  In In re Hispanics United of Buffalo,238 five employees were fired after
making critical remarks about their employer on Facebook; the National
Labor Review Board ordered their reinstatement because it violated their
right to protected concerted activity.239  When workers make complaints
about their pay, work schedules, or other terms and conditions of employ-
ment, the NLRA might provide protection from retaliatory measures.240
Given the recent judicial scrutiny imposed on class action litigation, em-
ployee-driven advocacy is needed more than ever to address growing pay
inequities.
C. Renewed Government Attention to Wage Rights
In 2009, the Obama Administration publicized its commitment to
wage and hour enforcement, committing additional resources for hiring
236. OUR WALMART: ORGANIZATION UNITED FOR RESPECT AT WALMART, Decla-
ration of Respect, http://forrespect.org/sign-the-declaration/ (last visited Nov. 9,
2013).
237. See 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2012) (prohibiting employers from interfering with
employees’ ability to organize).
238. No. 3-CA-27872, 2011 WL 3894520 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges Sept. 2,
2011).
239. See id.; see also Aroostook Cnty. Reg’l Ophthalmology Ctr., 317 N.L.R.B.
No. 32 (1995), enf. denied on other grounds 81 F.3d 209 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding
employee complaints to each other concerning schedule changes constituted pro-
tected activity).
240. The argument that worker advocates should look to the NLRA for pro-
tected worker activity is strengthened by the fact that early courts looked to the
NLRA in interpreting Title VII. See Franks v. Bowman Transport. Co., 424 U.S. 747
(1976) (applying NLRA caselaw in Title VII case and requiring award of retroactive
seniority); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (noting that
backpay provision of Title VII was modeled on NLRA, then applying standard
under NLRA to Title VII that backpay ordinarily should be rewarded).
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more DOL Wage and Hour Division investigators,241 engaging in a new
“regulatory philosophy” of requiring employers to audit themselves to en-
sure they are complying with the law,242 and voicing a renewed commit-
ment to investigate the misclassification of employees and enforcement of
wage and overtime laws.243  It is hard to calculate the success of these ini-
tiatives, given that the latest report analyzing DOL enforcement measures
dates back to 2008.
However, the Joint Economic Committee (tasked with reviewing eco-
nomic conditions and analyzing the effectiveness of economic policy) re-
ported on April 20, 2010, that the earnings penalty for part-time work is a
significant obstacle to pay equity between women and men—a sure sign
that the issue is at least on the federal government’s radar.  With the help
of advocates like Kim Bobo of the Interfaith Worker Justice group, who
tirelessly lobbies the federal, state, and local governments to systemically
address wage theft of low-wage workers,244 government officials are al-
ready becoming aware of a variety of wage abuses.  Including pay equity in
hourly allocation and rates is the next topic for advocates to include in
their fight against wage abuses.
VI. CONCLUSION
Hours equity is the new pay equity.  While many low-wage worker ad-
vocates focus on living wage and pay inequalities in their fight for work-
place fairness, the modern workplace requires regulation and protection
in scheduling shortfalls.  Scheduling fluctuations make it impossible for
part-time workers to plan, budget, take additional work or responsibilities,
and generally wreak havoc on their lives.  This is especially true for female
workers, who disproportionately represent high numbers of part-time
workers and who remain at the mercy of their supervisors in scheduling
hours.  Hours equity would provide much-needed stability to scheduling
that would allow female part-time workers to have a reliable schedule with
guaranteed hours so that they make an expected amount of pay.  While
241. See News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Statement by U.S. Secretary of
Labor Hilda L. Solis on Wage and Hour Division’s Increased Enforcement and
Outreach Efforts (Nov. 19, 2009), http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/whd/
whd20091452.htm.
242. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, Regulatory Agenda Narrative (Spring 2010), avail-
able at http://www.dol.gov/regulations/2010RegNarrative.htm (“Employers and
others in the Department’s regulated communities must understand that the bur-
den is on them to obey the law, not on the Labor Department to catch them violat-
ing the law.”).
243. See News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Statement of Secretary of Labor
Hilda L. Solis on Introduction of Legislation Regarding Issue of Misclassification
(Apr. 22, 2010), http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/whd/WHD20100541.htm
(“I look forward to working with the Congress to address the important issue of
misclassification of workers.”).
244. See BOBO, supra note 226, at 245–60 (providing avenues for addressing
wage theft); INTERFAITH WORKER JUSTICE, http://www.iwj.org (last visited Nov. 9,
2013).
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current statutory protections might not fully remedy these shortfalls, they
have the potential to do so if courts reconceptualize hours equity as being
worthy of protection.  New remedies can and should be ordered to ad-
dress this persistent problem facing many of our female workers today.
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